Who One Is

Hart, James G.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-8798-1

Cited by 19 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…This sense of ‘I-me-myself' is propertyless and it cannot be reduced to a set of attributes. Quoting Hart [[36], p. 310], we may say that, ‘if intelligibility is grasping properties, then the ‘‘myself'' (…) eludes our grasp.' Ipseity founds the so-called ‘radical self-recognition', which implies that I am always already aware of ‘I-me-myself' and have therefore no need for self-observation or self-reflection to assure myself of being myself.…”

Section: Schizophrenia As a Self-disordermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the one hand, it may be considered as a general, universal ‘form' of human consciousness. Yet, on the other hand, and notwithstanding its lack of properties, ipseity founds the most intimate, individuated (but propertyless) essence of our personal identity [36]. In that sense, we may, though obviously in a somewhat artificial way, distinguish ipseity from the more complex self, the so-called ‘narrative' or ‘extended' self, involving personal history, narrative-language, personality structure, and patterns of relating, and involving psychological concepts such as ‘self-image', ‘self-esteem', ‘self-presentation', etc.…”

Section: Schizophrenia As a Self-disordermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subjectivity and Schizophrenia: Another Look at Incomprehensibility and Treatment Nonadherence

Parnas

Henriksen

2013

Psychopathology

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Psychiatry is in a time of crisis. The absence of significant breakthroughs to actionable etiological knowledge has left the discipline in a state of uncertainty and worries are being voiced about its status and future. In our view, the stagnation can be, at least in part, ascribed to an excessive, behaviorist-oriented, epistemological, and ontological simplification of psychopathology. The aim of this phenomenological study is to articulate the notion of the ‘disordered self' in schizophrenia, a notion that we believe constitutes an important step forward in grasping its essential pathogenetic structures. Through the framework of self-disorders, we analyze two domains of the psychopathology of schizophrenia, seeking to recast their puzzling nature into more useful clinical and scientific terms. First, we examine the so-called schizophrenic incomprehensibility (bizarre gestalt, bizarre delusions, and ‘crazy actions') and argue that grasping the altered framework for experiencing, associated with the disordered self, makes these phenomena appear comprehensible to a considerable extent. Second, we explore the issue of treatment noncompliance and provide a novel account of ‘poor insight' into illness. We propose that poor insight into schizophrenia is not simply a problem of insufficient self- reflection due to psychological defenses or impaired metacognition, but rather that it is intrinsically expressive of the severity and nature of self-disorders. The instabilities of the first-person perspective throw the patient into a different, often quasisolipsistic, ontological-existential framework. We argue that interventions seeking to optimize the patients' compliance might prove more efficient if they take the alterations of the patients' ontological-existential framework into account.

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Section: Schizophrenia As a Self-disordermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Schizophrenia As a Self-disordermentioning

confidence: 99%