Who never tells a lie?

Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation

“…Other studies have used the sender-receiver game where cheating is strategic (i.e., the sender needs to send a message to the receiver about the real state of the world and the receiver may believe it or not). This includes, among others, Gneezy (2005), Sutter (2009), Lundquist et al (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Erat (2013) and Vanberg (2017). Other studies in which subjects can misreport their private information or send cheap-talk messages include Charness (2000a), Croson, Boles and design is that while the experimenter cannot know whether an individual is lying, statistical tests on the aggregate data show the extent to which the experimental population distorts the truth.…”

Unequal treatment toward copartisans versus non-copartisans is reduced when partisanship can be falsified

“…When discovered, dishonesty can incur material and reputational sanctions [ 25 ]. However, even absent the possibility of discovery or sanctioning, evidence suggests a strong, psychological disposition to tell the truth [ 18 , 22 , 26 ], though the evidence for widespread “lying aversion” has recently come under scrutiny [ 27 ].…”

Online Cheating Amid COVID-19

“…7 This cheating behavior supports the mounting evidence that the lack of "perfect honesty" exists in situations where the returns to dishonesty are high. Numerous studies using different settings and samples investigated in Gneezy (2005), Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Gächter and Schulz (2016), and Vanberg (2017) show that people are more likely to deceive if the marginal benefit from deception is significantly large. Therefore, professional competitions and examinations have to use extensive monitoring to prevent cheating.…”

“…,Gächter and Schulz (2016),Vanberg (2017),Martinelli et al (2018),Charness et al (2019), Alan, Ertac and Gumren (2019), andMaggioni and Rossignoli (2020).…”