Who needs a brain? Slime moulds, behavioural ecology and minimal cognition

Abstract

Although human decision making seems complex, there is evidence that many decisions are grounded in simple heuristics. Such heuristic models of decision making are widespread in nature. To understand how and why different forms of information processing evolve, it is insightful to study the minimal requirements for cognition. Here, we explore the minimally cognitive behaviour of the acellular slime mould, Physarum polycephalum, in order to discuss the ecological pressures that lead to the development of information processing mechanisms. We discuss evidence for memory, basic forms of learning and economically irrational choice in P. polycephalum. We compare P. polycephalum’s behaviour with a number of other non-neuronal organisms in order to question the evolutionary need for complex nervous systems to develop cognitive traits. By highlighting a few examples of common mechanisms, we conclude that all organisms contain the building blocks for more complex information processing. Returning the debate about cognition to the biological basics demystifies some of the confusion around the term ‘cognition’.

Learning in Cnidaria: A systematic review

“…Learning in Cnidaria means cognition without central brains, and as cognition outside of the central brain defines one interpretation of embodied cognition (Cheng, 2018;Hochner, 2012; see also Keijzer, 2017;Lyon, 2019;Smith-Ferguson & Beekman, 2019), Cnidariajellyfish, hyrda, and sea anemones in particularexhibit embodied cognition. Cnidaria join a host of organisms without brains, in some cases without nervous systems, as well as brained animals in showing cognition outside of or without a central brain.…”

Response to novelty induced by change in size and complexity of familiar objects in Lister-Hooded rats, a follow-up of 2019 study

“…Exploring a more complex environment creates more opportunities for adaptive behaviours such as escape or foraging. However, it opens a new pathway for the development of individual needs 25 , 26 , e.g. the capacity to build a more sophisticated cognitive map.…”

From allostatic agents to counterfactual cognisers: active inference, biological regulation, and the origins of cognition

“…An alternative (and increasingly popular) approach would be to ascribe some form of 'minimal' or 'proto-cognitive' status to bacteria, plants, and other aneural organisms (Ben-Jacob 2009;Calvo Garzón and Keijzer 2011;Gagliano 2015;Godfrey-Smith 2016a, b;Lyon 2015Lyon , 2019Segundo-Ortin and Calvo 2019;Smith-Ferguson and Beekman 2019;van Duijn et al 2006; for a dissenting view, see Adams 2018). Such terms might seem appealing in light of the mounting body of research claiming that many 'simple' organisms engage in primitive or precursory forms of cognitive activity (Baluška and Levin 2016;Levin et al 2017;Tang and Marshall 2018).…”