Who is policing the Police and Crime Commissioners?

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how the Police and Crime Commissioners have been scrutinised in their first nine months in office, focusing primarily on one particular force area. Design/methodology/approach – A brief analysis of the most current writing on this topic, including official documents such as minutes of police and crime panel meetings and Home Affairs Committee and Welsh Affairs Committee evidence sessions, as well various online news sources are provided. Academic literature spanning 30 years is also drawn upon. Findings – In considering particular major events in the first nine months of the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners, central government have been required to take a more prominent role in scrutiny in certain regions than first envisaged, due to ambiguity of legislative guidelines. Research limitations/implications – As an exploratory paper, one force area (Gwent) is the primary focus, sampled because of the issues faced in that area and its widespread coverage in the media. Practical implications – Problems with the legislative guidance for Police and Crime Commissioners, Police and Crime Panels and other involved agencies and individuals are highlighted. Originality/value – The paper contributes to the body of research investigating how the new policing governance framework in England and Wales is unfolding in practice. It is informed by both academic perspectives and real life examples.

Police and Crime Commissioners: new agents of crime and justice policy transfer?

“…Breaking with past arrangements however, the PRSR Act 2011 signalled that the Home Secretary was to retreat from local police affairs (Lister 2013, Newburn 2012b. Indeed, while still possessing the authority to intervene in the event of force failure or when subnational decision-making poses a danger to national security, the Home Secretary's 'hands-off' role now primarily entails sporadically issuing a Strategic Policing Requirement that sets out threats that require a national policing capability and for which Chief Constables are to pay due regard when exercising their duties (Chambers 2014, Lister 2013, Lister and Rowe 2015. In addition to this change, many of the governance and executive functions that previously fell within the remit of Police Authorities have been assumed by directly elected local PCCs, each of whom has a four-year term of office.…”

Police relational accountabilities: The paralysis of police accountability?

“…Various authors have also highlighted how members of PCPs may lack time and resources to perform their roles. Further, some have questioned the effectiveness of PCPs, highlighting how PCPs may lack authority, might have limited power and could be considered ineffectual (Chambers, 2014;Lister, 2014;Bailey, 2015;Lister and Rowe, 2015;Loveday, 2018).…”

Civilian oversight of the police in England and Wales

“…Although some have expressed cautious optimism about the new system in England and Wales (Loveday, 2013a;Raine and Keasey, 2012), these same concerns have been echoed (Independent Police Commission, 2013). Thus, conflict between PCCs and chief Constables have been widely reported (Chambers, 2014;Loveday, 2013bLoveday, , 2013cStrickland, 2013), albeit some have argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing (Loveday, 2013a). The dangers of PCCs becoming involved in operational decision-making has been raised (Lister, 2013), and the extent to which PCCs have created their own fiefdoms (Mawby, 2016) or indulged in cronyism (Loveday, 2013b) to the detriment of their accountability to local constituencies (Lister and Rowe, 2015;Loveday et al, 2014;Reiner, 2016) has been debated.…”