Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space*

Krisch, Nico

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00492.x

Cited by 53 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…(Teubner 1997) 6 In the same vein Nico Krisch leaves no doubt about the aim of his project entitled "beyond constitutionalism" (2010). His clear goal is to envision "post-national law" and thus he is not "afraid of radical pluralism" (Krisch 2011;Melissaris 2009, 4) 7 . Similarly Berman does not see an "intrinsic reason to privilege nation-state communities over others" (2007, 1180, 62 with reference to Anderson 2006.…”

Section: The Definition Of Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Descriptive vs. prescriptive global legal pluralism: a gentle reminder of David Hume’s is–ought divide

Kirchmair

2019

The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

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In [almost all of the analyses of global legal pluralism], which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes [the existence of "global legal pluralism"], or makes observations concerning [the "global Bukowina" regarding international] human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. (Hume 1738, book III, part I, ch. I) Pointing at David Hume's powerful insight, this article aims to remind us of the necessity of sharply distinguishing between global legal pluralism as the description of recent factual developments, drawing attention for example, towards the massive increase in international actors, norms and tribunals as well as adjudicators on the one hand. And, on the other hand, as a different issue, the question of how we ought to deal with or even solve those legal conflicts (based on a (common) framework) resulting from these plural, overlapping legal claims. The "normative move" in the global legal pluralism debate asks for sufficient justification for its normative claims. This article concludes that the isought divide is respected at best if prescriptive proposals to solve legal conflicts are not termed "pluralistic." Instead, I shall suggest, it is more precise to refer to a necessarily common framework which addresses the question as to how those conflicts should be resolved together or at least in a way acceptable to all parties. Finally, this article holds that this common framework depends hugely on the context. Thus, solutions are more likely to be found if we focus on specific contexts instead of drawing on universal solutions for different situations.

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Section: The Definition Of Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To which system are they to give their fidelity in action? "Regarding Neil MacCormick's shift from radical pluralism towards "pluralism under international law," see, Krisch (2011). 30.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Descriptive vs. prescriptive global legal pluralism: a gentle reminder of David Hume’s is–ought divide

Kirchmair

2019

The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

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“…Merry 2006). Die Postkoloniale Theorie und feministische Ansätze rekonstruieren wissenschaftssoziologisch oder ethnographisch Ungleichheitsstrukturen, die tief in soziale Institutionen, aber auch elementare Strukturen wie Sprache und Diskurse eingeschrieben sind (Matin 2013;Dhawan 2013), während schließlich die Internationale Rechtspolitik der spezifischen Normativität von internationalem Recht nachspürt und Ermächtigungs-und Entmachtungstendenzen von internationalem Recht diskutiert oder die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer rechtlichen Konstituierung der politischen Ordnung debattiert (Peters 2009;Kumm 2009;Krisch 2011).…”

Section: Schlussbemerkungenunclassified

Herrschaftszeiten. Internationale Politische Theorie als Gesellschaftstheorie der internationalen Beziehungen

Deitelhoff¹,

Daase²

2016

ZPTh

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Internationale Politische Theorie ist nach wie vor ein nur vage konturiertes Forschungsfeld. Angesiedelt an der Schnittstelle zwischen Politischer Theorie und Internationalen Beziehungen, ist sie lange im Sinne einer Ethik internationaler Politik verstanden worden. Wir plädieren dafür, sie als kritische Analyse von globalen Herrschaftsstrukturen zu verstehen, das heißt als Gesellschaftstheorie der Internationalen Beziehungen. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie dabei auf Vorarbeiten der Englischen Schule und Kritischer Theorien in den Internationalen Beziehungen zurückgegriffen werden kann. Er zeigt darüber hinaus, in welchem Sinne von Herrschaft in der internationalen Politik gesprochen werden kann und wie Herrschaftsstrukturen über den Widerstand rekonstruiert werden können, den sie auslösen. Dabei ergeben sich fruchtbare Anknüpfungspunkte zu anderen Disziplinen, die zunehmend in die Internationale Politische Theorie integriert werden sollten.

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“…They also commonly perceive the state and its law as a form of hegemony that needs to be challenged by alternative politics emerging at subnational, national and transnational levels of global society (see, for instance, Rajagopal ). Finally, and most importantly, radical theories of legal pluralism often contrast the concept of constitutional and political sovereignty to spontaneously evolving sectors of society which, instead of being constituted by political force, engage in the parallel processes of self‐constitutionalisation and constitutional fragmentation (Krisch ; Teubner ).…”

Section: Is Ehrlich Having the Last Laugh? Radicalising The Sociologimentioning

confidence: 99%

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

Priban

2015

Ratio Juris

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The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of "weak" and "strong" pluralism has to be reassessed because "weak" jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.Theories of legal pluralism are commonly perceived as critical of the very concept of sovereignty because the plurality of legal orders and regimes indicates the absence of the ultimate rule of recognition, decision-making power or the basic norm. They are equally critical of state law as a supreme legal order backed by political deliberation and decision-making, and emphasise the role of non-state legal orders, agents and organisations. Pluralistic perspectives have been adopted by mainstream jurisprudence and the discourse of legal pluralism is thus currently typical of the differentiation between the "weak" juristic concept of legal pluralism drawing on the state legal systems and the "strong" concept of legal pluralism drawing on sociological and anthropological perspectives of law (Griffiths 1986, 5-8).In this article, therefore, I pursue the goal of analysing transformations of state sovereignty in global society by critically examining theories of legal and constitutional pluralism. In the first two sections, I establish the connection between legal globalisation and theories of legal pluralism, and discuss MacCormick and Walker's theories of legal and constitutional pluralism especially in the EU context. bs_bs_banner

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Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space*

Cited by 53 publications

References 78 publications

Descriptive vs. prescriptive global legal pluralism: a gentle reminder of David Hume’s is–ought divide

Descriptive vs. prescriptive global legal pluralism: a gentle reminder of David Hume’s is–ought divide

Herrschaftszeiten. Internationale Politische Theorie als Gesellschaftstheorie der internationalen Beziehungen

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

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