Who Gets What and Why: An Analysis of State Level Funding in the Department of Homeland Security

Abstract

The goals pursued by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) require the collaboration of dozens of federal agencies and thousands of state and local entities. Intergovernmental funding within DHS has become one of the most politicized and criticized aspects of this process. This study analyzed the US Department of Homeland Security's state grant program from 2002 to 2007 to examine whether strong incentives to distribute these funds politically overrode the impetus to distribute them according to greatest risk or need. Using a random effects panel data model, several independent variables reflecting political and risk factors were regressed to examine the extent each of these factors affects the funding process. This paper further advances the research by explicitly comparing the relative importance of political versus risk factors over a 6 year time period with particular focus on whether allocations within Homeland Security's state grant program are primarily determined by political or objective criterion. The research found, that the political variables are more consistently significant predictors of allocations than the risk variables. The findings also provide evidence that formula grants, administered to states, by federal agencies are still susceptible to political influence.

Contemporary Policy Challenges in Protecting the Homeland

“…Prante and Bohara () present evidence that DHS grant funding tracks with indicators of risk as opposed to “pork barrel” politics, yet, more recent research draws a bit of a different picture. LaPira () describes the process of volatility in lobbying activity surrounding the DHS, and Nordyke () concludes that DHS intergovernmental funding “has become one of the most politicized and criticized aspects.” Tracking DHS spending over a six‐year timeframe, Nordyke finds that political factors are the most consistent predictors for the state grant program. Eisinger () suggests that broader homeland security aid was distributed inline with political considerations, and Friedman () contends that Americans want an excess of homeland security over what would be prescribed by balancing cost and benefit—and that few policymakers are willing to push back on this trend.…”

Fiscal federalism and American exceptionalism: why is there no federal equalisation system in the United States?

“…Perhaps even more crucial, formula-based equalisation policy goes against the logic of “credit claiming” (Mayhew 1974; Weaver 1986) associated with pork-barrel politics. Indeed, members of Congress typically like arrangements that allow them to “earmark” monies for specific projects because they benefit politically from them, while they would not directly benefit from formula-based general-fund financing (Frisch 1998, 18; Nordyke 2008, 21). With earmarks, members of Congress can vote for a specific outlay, whereas with general-fund financing, they can only support a bundle of expenditures (Buchanan 1999 [1967], Ch.…”