Who Gets the Catch? How Conventional Catch Attribution Frameworks Undermine Equity in Transboundary Fisheries

Davis, Ruth; Hanich, Quentin A; Haas, Bianca; Cisneros‐Montemayor, Andrés M.; Azmi, Kamal; Seto, Katherine; Swartz, Wilf; González‐Espinosa, Pedro C.; Colléter, Mathieu; Adams, Timothy

doi:10.3389/fmars.2022.831868

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Without transparency in subsidies data, attributing catch caught in coastal States waters to coastal States in calculating catch history proves to be a simple fix as evident from the analysis. Catch attribution is consistent with LOSC and will better support the goals of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 (Davis et al, 2022). As migration patterns change with climate change, attributing catches could pave way to safe guard resources and mitigate the impacts on coastal communities.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 73%

Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss

Sinan¹,

Willis²,

Swartz³

et al. 2022

Front. Hum. Dyn.

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One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 73%

Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss

Sinan¹,

Willis²,

Swartz³

et al. 2022

Front. Hum. Dyn.

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“…[15] calls it "flag state allocation", indicating that it is characteristically applied to high-seas fisheries and generally benefits distant water fleets (DWF). According to many commentators, historical entitlement is the most prevalent criterion in the world [4,8,40,41,44,55,86,90]. Ref.…”

Section: Historical Entitlement-past Track Record; Status Quomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[44,60,63] say it also punishes fishers who temporarily stop fishing to allow stocks to recover. Moreover, it discriminates against countries in the global south that do not have records of fishing histories [4,90]. Ref.…”

Section: Historical Entitlement-past Track Record; Status Quomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As ref. [90] points out, until 1982, a fish catch was attributed to states according to the nationality of the vessel fishing rather than its location. But when the 200 nm EEZs were established by UNCLOS in 1982, each coastal state was granted the legal right of ownership over the natural resources in its EEZ, including the right to set its own quota for the migratory/straddling fish stocks within it [14,90].…”

Section: Sovereign Right-a Coastal State's Right To Set Quota For Sto...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fishing for Principles: The Fairness of Fishing Quota Allocations

Gray

2024

Sustainability

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Allocating fish quota is a hotly disputed issue across the world, and many different criteria have been employed to achieve it. However, little attention has been devoted to examining the fairness of those criteria. This study aims to fill this gap by focusing on the eight most prominent criteria that have been used or proposed—prior use; market forces; historical entitlement; geographical proximity; sovereign right; economic dependence; environmental stewardship; and equal shares—and examining their respective ethical credentials as principles of distributive justice. The assumption lying behind this aim is that if agreement can be reached on which criteria are the fairest, future conflicts over quota allocations might be averted. The method used to conduct this research was normative analysis, and the materials analysed were obtained from databases such as the Web of Science. However, the study found that the ethically strongest criteria are environmental stewardship and economic dependence, but the most prevalent criteria are historical entitlement and geographical proximity (zonal attachment). So, the principles of distributive justice that are most likely to be applied are not the fairest principles but the principles with the greatest political support. For some commentators, this signifies that justice and ethics have been sacrificed to power and politics. However, there is some evidence that the tide is turning and the arguments in favour of fairness, perhaps in hybrid forms, are beginning to gain momentum.

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“…An 'equitable' allocation would be unlikely to be achieved if allocations were made to flag States on the basis of their fishing history in the EEZs of coastal States. In contrast, making allocations to coastal States based on past fishing in their EEZs would be consistent with international law (Davis et al, 2022) and would assist in mitigating the economic impacts of stock losses incurred by coastal States-and particularly by Pacific SIDS-as a result of climate change. Flag States would continue to have the opportunity to fish in coastal States' EEZs by negotiating access for their vessels, consistent with the established practice.…”

Section: Conservation and Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing cooperative responses by regional fisheries management organisations to climate-driven redistribution of tropical Pacific tuna stocks

et al. 2022

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Climate change is predicted to alter the distributions of tropical tuna stocks in the Pacific Ocean. Recent modelling projects significant future shifts in tuna biomass from west to east, and from national jurisdictions to high seas areas. As the distributions of these stocks change, the relevant regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)—the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)—will need to develop an expanded framework for cooperation and collaboration to fulfil their conservation and management responsibilities under international law. The key elements of a possible expanded framework for cooperation can be developed, and fundamental areas for collaboration identified, by applying and adapting principles established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, and the constituent instruments of the RFMOs themselves. Our analysis reveals a wide range of important issues requiring cooperation, and three clear priorities. First, a formal mechanism for cooperation is needed to enable effective and efficient decision-making and action by the two RFMOs on key issues. Second, further cooperation is required in scientific research and modelling to better understand the biology and distributions of Pacific tuna stocks and how they will respond to climate change, and to inform stock assessments and harvest strategies. Third, the RFMOs must cooperate to define appropriate limits on fishing for each stock in a way that ensures they are compatible across the two organisations, taking into account their different members and management regimes.

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Who Gets the Catch? How Conventional Catch Attribution Frameworks Undermine Equity in Transboundary Fisheries

Cited by 10 publications

References 27 publications

Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss

Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss

Fishing for Principles: The Fairness of Fishing Quota Allocations

Enhancing cooperative responses by regional fisheries management organisations to climate-driven redistribution of tropical Pacific tuna stocks

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