Who Donates in Campaigns?

Magleby, David B.; Goodliffe, Jay; Olsen, Joseph A.

doi:10.1017/9781108554428

Cited by 32 publications

(44 citation statements)

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“…In other words, there were seven times more contributors when hidden donors were included. This simple fact shows the potential magnitude of the censoring problem, and is similar to the numbers reported in Magleby, Goodliffe and Olsen (2018), where they estimated that 82% of Romney donors and 88% of Obama donors in 2012 were small donors. 14…”

Section: Datasupporting

confidence: 84%

“…The second explanation may also have merit, because we often find that intermediate records of contribution year-to-date sums are grossly inaccurate. This speaks to the difficulty of working with campaign finance data.9 As discussed earlier, there is some debate and mixed evidence in the literature about whether small donors are polarizing-that is, whether ideologically extreme candidates attract more small donors(Wilcox, 2008;Bonica, 2011;Malbin, 2013;Johnson, 2010;Culberson, McDonald and Robbins, 2018;Magleby, Goodliffe and Olsen, 2018). Unfortunately, although this is a very important and interesting question, due to the nature of our data, we cannot test this claim in this paper.…”

mentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Hidden donors, meanwhile, were more likely to have been solicited to contribute online. Magleby, Goodliffe and Olsen (2018) makes it clear that campaigns prioritize large donors over the small, especially due to changes introduced by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. However, appeals to small donors are becoming more prevalent in American campaigns, especially in recent elections as the Internet is becoming central to campaign fundraising (Malbin, 2013;Karpf, 2013).…”

Section: Past Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper contributes to the literature on small donors by analyzing an entire donor population for a presidential candidate using complete individual-level data. While our data do not have the more in-depth questions and breadth that are available in surveys like that of Magleby, Goodliffe and Olsen (2018) or Graf, Malbin and Panagopoulos (2006), we are not limited to survey respondents-we can bring the entire population of visible and hidden Sanders contributors to study, which can complement the mostly survey-based existing literature. This allows us to provide a set of analyses regarding the hidden donors in 2016, to document their contribution behavior, and to establish a baseline for future research on small and hidden donors.…”

Section: Past Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Kim

Álvarez

Katz

2020

Preprint

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Inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-to-date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so that contribution histories of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors and "hidden donors," i.e., small donors who are invisible due to censoring and routinely ignored in existing research. We use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary (or conduit) committee. These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study donors who are normally hidden. For the Sanders campaign, there were seven hidden donors for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were responsible for 33.8% of Sanders' campaign funds. We show that hidden donors start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries. We suggest that as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller donors, more research on what motivates them is necessary.

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Section: Datasupporting

confidence: 84%

mentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Past Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Past Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Kim

Álvarez

Katz

2020

Preprint

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“…Although a crucial part of the data generating process, the censoring problem and hidden donors have not been adequately addressed in the campaign finance literature (Key 1964;Francia et al 2003;Barber 2016;Magleby, Goodliffe, and Olsen 2018). There is, after all, little that could be done about this censoring, short of changing the law.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Alvarez

Katz

Kim

2020

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy

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Inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-to-date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so that contribution histories of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors and ''hidden donors,'' i.e., small donors who are invisible due to censoring and routinely ignored in existing research. We use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary (or conduit) committee. These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study donors who are normally hidden. For the Sanders campaign, there were seven hidden donors for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were responsible for 33.8% of Sanders' campaign funds. We show that hidden donors start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries. We suggest that as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller donors, more research on what motivates them is necessary.

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Information Disorder and the Illiberal Public Sphere

Štětka,

Mihelj

2024

The Illiberal Public Sphere

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This chapter is devoted to the mapping and analysis of the disinformation ecosystem across our sample, examining the ways in which different stages of the illiberal public sphere are linked with the dissemination and reception of false or manipulated information and narratives. We first explore the extent of people’s exposure to misinformation, before mapping the information ecosystems across the four countries and examining specific channels and brands which play a major role in the dissemination of misinformation. Our findings indicate that in countries with a more advanced illiberal public sphere, the perception of misinformation is greater, and their channels are more likely to involve mainstream news media brands. The chapter then focuses on the prevalence of beliefs that are rooted in some of the most popular conspiracy narratives in the region—those involving the US philanthropist George Soros and the 2010 Smolensk air disaster. Finally, we pay attention to a specific communication channel which serves as an important instrument for disinformation campaigns in some of the countries, namely the so-called ‘chain emails’.

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Who Donates in Campaigns?

Cited by 32 publications

References 0 publications

Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data

Information Disorder and the Illiberal Public Sphere

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