Who benefits from fisheries co-management? A case study in Lake Chiuta, Malawi

Is Co-management Feasible in Achieving Fisheries Sustainability? A Case of Oman’s Lobster Fishery

“…The driving force behind the move towards co-management for the case in hand was found to be from local scientists and international experts which is in contrast with the findings from Cinner et al (2012) where move towards co-management in case of Kenya, Tanzania, and Madagascar was mainly driven by donor ideology and subsequent support. However with regard to conditions that led to the development of co-management idea, the present finding is in line with the case of SSF of Lake Chiuta where circumstances such as environmental degradation and overexploitation of fish stocks led to the government initiated development of co-management in the early 1990s (Donda, 2017). Yang & Pomeroy (2017) mentioned that to prevent the increasing rate of deterioration of SSF resources in the Philippines and due to poor performance of the other management system government actively promoted the development of community-based fisheries management (CBFM).…”

Outcomes of participatory fisheries management: An example from co-management in Zambia's Mweru-Luapula fishery

“…Proponents of co - management further claim that it results in legitimacy of the regime system ( Jentoft et al, 1998 ). Allowing resource users to influence the decision-making process through information sharing enables them to acquire scientific information on ecological conditions of their ecosystem and encourages their input in the design of regulations ( Donda, 2017 ). Resource users’ participation reduces government biasness towards meeting government needs and improves the quality of regulations that are ultimately designed.…”

“…Co-management also offers conflict resolution platform where local disputes can be managed locally and cheaply through the various established local-level institutions ( Ho et al, 2016 ; Donda, 2017 ). In addition, the process of information sharing and interaction creates trust and changes the behaviour and attitudes of resource users towards state agencies and fellow resource users, thereby reducing conflicts with the higher authorities ( Jentoft et al, 1998 ; Ballet et al, 2009 ).…”

“…In the Southern region, co-management studies in Mozambique's Kwirikwidge province showed reduced conflicts between small-scale and industrial fishing fleets, reduced use of destructive (mosquito) nets, increased awareness of conservation measures and financial support to fishers ( Lopes and Gervasio, 1999 ; Benkenstein, 2013 ) while Malawi's co-management system on Lake Chiuta successfully banned destructive seine net fishing activities through local Beach Village Committees and enforced formal and locally developed rules. Benefits accruing to local fishers include stabilized catches, increased household incomes and reduced monitoring and surveillance costs on the part of the state ( Njaya 2005 ; Donda, 2017 ).…”

Managing the fishery commons at Marseille: How a medieval institution failed to accommodate change in an age of globalization

“…They typically centralize information concerning new actors to preserve positive‐sum games based on cooperation (Milgrom et al., ) and/or actively generate new social norms (Stone Sweet, ). Another successful strategy of “rule‐based governance” is to rely on a more constraining governance entity such as the state, which has the means of imposing solutions on defectors (e.g., Donda, : 150) or empowering local stakeholders with the coercive authority to do so (e.g., Stoffle, Halmo, Wagner, & Luczkovich, : 375). It is noteworthy in this regard that Ostrom included in her list of design principles the possibility for CPIs to obtain “minimal recognition of rights to organize” from the state (Ostrom, : 101) (design principle 7) and to be organized in “multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom, : 101–102) (design principle 8).…”