Who Are You? Secure Identities in Ad Hoc Networks

Gilbert, Seth; Newport, Calvin; Zheng, Chaodong

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45174-8_16

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Resource Testing. Resource testing requires a prover to demonstrate utilization of a radio channel [55,56,101]. 3 Consider a wireless setting where each device has a single radio that provides access to one of several channels.…”

Section: Proof-of-work (Pow)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper)

Gupta

Saia

Young

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Proof-of-work puzzles and CAPTCHAS consume enormous amounts of energy and time. These techniques are examples of resource burning: verifiable consumption of resources solely to convey information.Can these costs be eliminated? It seems unlikely since resource burning shares similarities with "money burning" and "costly signaling", which are foundational to game theory, biology, and economics. Can these costs be reduced? Yes, research shows we can significantly lower the asymptotic costs of resource burning in many different settings.In this paper, we survey the literature on resource burning; take positions based on predictions of how the tool is likely to evolve; and propose several open problems targeted at the theoretical distributed-computing research community.

show abstract

Section: Proof-of-work (Pow)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper)

Gupta

Saia

Young

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While PoW-based defenses work in general network settings, domain-specific results for mitigating the Sybil attack have been discovered. In a wireless network with multiple communication channels, Sybil attacks can be mitigated via radio-resource testing which relies on the inability of the adversary to listen to many channels simultaneously [17,18,37]. However, this approach may fail if the adversary can monitor most or all of the channels.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

ToGCom: An Asymmetric Sybil Defense

Gupta,

Saia,

Young

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Radio-Resource Testing. In a wireless network with multiple communication channels, Sybil attacks can be mitigated via radio-resource testing which relies on the inability of the adversary to listen to many channels simultaneously [26,27,51]. However, this approach may fail if the adversary can monitor most or all of the channels.…”

Section: Sybil Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bankrupting Sybil Despite Churn

Gupta¹,

Saia²,

Young³

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A Sybil attack occurs when an adversary pretends to be multiple identities (IDs). Limiting the number of Sybil (bad) IDs to a minority permits the use of well-established tools for tolerating malicious behavior, such as protocols for Byzantine consensus and secure multiparty computation.A popular technique for enforcing this minority is resource burning; that is, the verifiable consumption of a network resource, such as computational power, bandwidth, or memory. Unfortunately, prior defenses based on resource burning require non-Sybil (good) IDs to consume at least as many resources as the adversary, unless the rate of churn for good IDs is sufficiently low. Since many systems exhibit high churn, this is a significant barrier to deployment.We present two algorithms that offer useful guarantees against a Sybil adversary under a broadly-applicable model of churn. The first is GoodJEst, which estimates the number of good IDs that join the system over any window of time, despite the adversary injecting bad IDs. GoodJEst is applicable to a broad range of system settings and here we demonstrate its use in our second algorithm, a new resourceburning Sybil defense called Ergo. Even under high churn, Ergo guarantees (1) there is always a minority of bad IDs in the system, and (2) when the system is under attack, the good IDs burn resources at a total rate which is sublinear in the adversary's consumption.To evaluate the impact of our theoretical results, we investigate the performance of Ergo alongside prior defenses that employ resource burning. Based on our experiments, we design heuristics that further improve the performance of Ergo by up to four orders of magnitude over these previous Sybil defenses.

show abstract

Who Are You? Secure Identities in Ad Hoc Networks

Cited by 12 publications

References 19 publications

Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper)

Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper)

ToGCom: An Asymmetric Sybil Defense

Bankrupting Sybil Despite Churn

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About