White House Staff Turnover in Year One of the Trump Administration: Context, Consequences, and Implications for Governing<sup>1</sup>

Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn

doi:10.1111/psq.12479

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Also surprisingly, the tenure of a majority of ministerial advisers is shorter than the minister who hired them. Th is high turnover could illustrate instability in ministers' offi ces (an indicator of poor governance), as has been observed in other executive offi ces (see Tenpas 2018). In addition, it could also indicate yet another form of patronage, where elected politicians bring their agents into a position of infl uence, which then enables them to later transfer into either a high civil service position or a senior private sector role.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Tenure is also important. In the Executive Offi ce of the President in the United States, the turnover of advisers is considered a proxy measurement on the relative health of the offi ce, with high turnover linked to instability and poor governance (Tenpas 2018). In addition, some studies have shown that experience as an adviser can be a stepping-stone to a career as an elected offi cial (Goplerud 2015; see also Askim et al 2020).…”

Section: Conceptualizing Ministerial Advisersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

Krajňák

Staroňová

Pickering

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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This study examines the transparency of the regulatory framework under which ministerial advisors exist within the politicized context of a Central and Eastern European perspective. We compare profiles and career paths of ministerial advisers under five different types of coalition governments and examine if variance across government types can be explained by type of party – established vs. new parties. Empirically, the article draws on a cohort of 162 ministerial advisers in Slovakia across five governments from 2010 to 2020. We arrive at multiple findings. Firstly, we suggest the limitation in the availability and reporting of data is an important finding as it highlights accountability gaps and lack of government transparency irrespective of the party in power. Secondly, within the low regulatory environment, ministers appoint multiple types of staff including both formal “visible” ministerial advisers and “invisible” ministerial agents that, if one could accurately measure, would likely demonstrate that the ministerial advisory system is more inflated than we currently present. The ad-hoc nature of the advisory system also creates fluctuations in the size of the ministerial adviser cohort across governments and across different ministries. This would also help to explain the next finding, which is that, contrary to the experience in many countries, the overall size of the advisor population does not grow, probably because executive politicians have other avenues of appointing advisory agents. Fourthly, the advisers have a fairly equal distribution of prior employment from both the public sector and the private sector, but we do see some evidence of more established political parties preferring to recruit from the public sector and newer parties preferring to recruit from the private sector. Lastly, the appointment process appears to be highly controlled by individual ministers, suggesting personal ties are essential (link between ministerial and advisor education) and party-political criteria are a low consideration. The research is conducted using a biographical approach in which freedom of information requests and open source data is scrapped and then triangulated via a dozen interviews with current and former advisers. It argues that regulation is weak, lacking public scrutiny, which provides loopholes for employing ministerial agents in informal ways that could create, at worst, the opportunity for corrupt behavior, or at least, lead to poor practices in good governance. Therefore, future research should focus on both the formal “visible” and informal “invisible” ways that ministers recruit their advisory agents, how their agents function, and whether existing regulatory measures create a transparent and accountable governance framework.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Conceptualizing Ministerial Advisersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

Krajňák

Staroňová

Pickering

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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“…Likewise, the turnover in Trump's cabinet (14) exceeded by far the first‐term turnover of all presidents since Reagan, with four secretaries of defense, four attorneys general, and four secretaries of homeland security (including acting secretaries), compared with Obama, 2; George W. Bush, 2; Clinton, 4; George H. W. Bush, 8; and Reagan, 6 (Tenpas 2021). Many of the cabinet secretaries resigned under pressure, and several resigned because of the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol: Elaine Chou (Commerce), Betsy DeVos (Education), Alex Azar (HHS), and Chad Wolf (DHS).…”

Section: Resignations Insults and Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

President Trump and the Shallow State: Disloyalty at the Highest Levels

Pfiffner¹

2022

Pres Stud Q

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President Donald Trump often complained about the "deep state" of career civil servants who, he asserted, were determined to undermine his presidency. But it was his own presidential appointees who most visibly resisted his directives. Political appointees are expected to be the most loyal advocates of a president's policy agenda, riding herd on the many bureaucracies of the executive branch. This article analyzes resistance to Trump's policy directives by his own appointees in the White House, cabinet, military, and intelligence community. It concludes that this level of resistance is unprecedented in the modern presidency.President Donald Trump often complained about the "deep state" of career civil servants who, he asserted, were determined to undermine his presidency. But it was his own presidential appointees who most visibly resisted his directives. Political appointees are expected to be the most loyal advocates of a president's policy agenda, riding herd on the many bureaucracies of the executive branch. Yet Trump's appointees in the White House, cabinet, military, and intelligence community refused to carry out many of the president's directives to an extent unprecedented in the modern presidency. President Trump's appointees went well beyond the normal disagreements about policy that characterize every administration; they resorted to slow-walking orders, refusing to comply with directives, and even outright sabotage (e.g., removing documents from the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office). Even Vice President Mike Pence, under Trump's pressure, refused to break the law when presiding over the formal counting of electoral votes on January 6, 2021. Leadership is central to the 573 Presidential Studies Quarterly

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“…As a result, the turnover of Trump's cabinet secretaries was greater than in any recent administration. He fired 10 cabinet secretaries, in addition to four resignations after the January 6 assault on the Capitol; only four stayed on for the full four‐year term (Tenpas 2021a). Trump also filled his cabinet with more “acting” secretaries than any other president (Condon 2021).…”

Section: The Cabinetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizing the Biden Presidency

Pfiffner¹

2021

Pres Stud Q

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After the disruptive term of Donald Trump, President Biden initiated a restoration of the regular order of the presidency, which had been established by presidents of both parties over the past half‐century, this article will examine the establishment of the Biden presidency, beginning with his transition into office. It will analyze the White House staff and organization as well as Biden's use of his cabinet secretaries and the recruitment of political appointees.

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White House Staff Turnover in Year One of the Trump Administration: Context, Consequences, and Implications for Governing¹

Cited by 15 publications

References 3 publications

Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

President Trump and the Shallow State: Disloyalty at the Highest Levels

Organizing the Biden Presidency

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White House Staff Turnover in Year One of the Trump Administration: Context, Consequences, and Implications for Governing1

Cited by 15 publications

References 3 publications

Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

Ministerial Advisers in Slovakia: Profiles and Career Paths, 2010 – 2020

President Trump and the Shallow State: Disloyalty at the Highest Levels

Organizing the Biden Presidency

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

White House Staff Turnover in Year One of the Trump Administration: Context, Consequences, and Implications for Governing¹