Whistleblowing Intentions of Lower-Level Employees: The Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer Power Status

Gao, Jingyu; Greenberg, Ronald I.; Wong‐On‐Wing, Bernard

doi:10.1007/s10551-013-2008-4

“…In line with this definition, most studies have examined whistleblowers who are members of organizations, i.e., employees. In these studies, their job positions differed considerably in terms of hierarchy, i.e., upper-level managers (Keenan 1990(Keenan , 2000(Keenan , 2002, managers and professionals (Chiu 2003), managers from different hierarchical levels (Nayir and Herzig 2012;Tavakoli et al 2003), professionals (MacNab andWorthley 2008), personnel executives (Barnett 1992); internal auditors (Robinson et al 2012), internal auditors and management accountants (Seifert et al 2010), employees (Bjørkelo et al 2010;Callahan and Collins 1992;Miceli and Near 1984;Singer et al 1998;Stansbury and Victor 2009), lower-level employees (Gao et al 2015), working population (Kaptein 2011), bank employees ), public sector employees (Cassematis and Wortley 2013), government officials (Park et al 2005), police officers (Park and Blenkinsopp 2009), and military employees . In a number of whistleblowing studies, student samples were used as a proxy for employees (e.g., Bhal and Dadhich 2011;Dalton and Radtke 2013;Kaplan and Schultz 2007;Kaplan et al 2009;Liyanarachchi and Newdick 2009;Lowe et al 2015;Park et al 2008Park et al , 2014Trongmateerut and Sweeney 2013).…”

Section: Who?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies: A Critical Review and Research Agenda

Culiberg

¹

,

Mihelič

²

2016

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Whistleblowing is a controversial yet socially significant topic of interest due to its impact on employees, organizations, and society at large. The purpose of this paper is to integrate knowledge of whistleblowing with theoretical advancements in the broader domain of business ethics to propose a novel approach to research and practice engaged in this complex phenomenon. The paper offers a conceptual framework, i.e., the wheel of whistleblowing, that is developed to portray the different features of whistleblowing by applying the whistleblower's perspective. The framework is based on five ''W'' questions: Who, What, hoW, Why, and to Whom? The answers to the proposed questions clarify the main aspects of whistleblowing, provide insights into existing studies of the subject, and identify relevant gaps in the literature which, in turn, offer opportunities for future research.

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“…Evidence is mixed. While Choo et al (2015) in a laboratory experiment and Gao et al (2015) in an experimental survey find that the number of bystanders increases the willingness to blow the whistle, Robinson et al (2014), Miceli and Near (1988) and Miceli et al (1991) find no effect or even a positive effect. Importantly, in all these bystander studies the potential informants are either just observers and not affected by the misconduct or the effect on the potential informant is not explicitly controlled for.…”

Section: Situational and Individual Determinantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants

Schmolke

¹

,

Utikal

²

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning authority. We find that fines for non-reporting insiders, rewards and even simple commands increase the probability of whistleblowing. We find the strongest effect for fines. Situational determinants also influence the willingness to blow the whistle: Insiders who are negatively affected by the misconduct are more likely to blow the whistle than non-affected or profiting insiders. Those (negatively affected) victims are also sensitive to the misconduct's impact on the authority sanctioning the misconduct (public authority or employer): Whistleblowing is more likely if the enforcement authority is negatively affected compared to positively or not affected. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…the authority. An exception is the survey by Gao et al (2015). They show that the willingness to blow the whistle is higher when the authority is external compared to internal.…”

Section: Situational and Individual Determinantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants

Schmolke

¹

,

Utikal

²

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning authority. We find that fines for non-reporting insiders, rewards and even simple commands increase the probability of whistleblowing. We find the strongest effect for fines. Situational determinants also influence the willingness to blow the whistle: Insiders who are negatively affected by the misconduct are more likely to blow the whistle than non-affected or profiting insiders. Those (negatively affected) victims are also sensitive to the misconduct's impact on the authority sanctioning the misconduct (public authority or employer): Whistleblowing is more likely if the enforcement authority is negatively affected compared to positively or not affected. Terms of use: Documents in

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Whistleblowing Intentions of Lower-Level Employees: The Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer Power Status

Cited by 108 publications

References 37 publications

The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies: A Critical Review and Research Agenda

The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies: A Critical Review and Research Agenda

Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants

Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants

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