Which World Should Be Represented in Representative Design?

Hoffrage, Ulrich; Hertwig, Ralph

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614576.016

Cited by 10 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Our results are reminiscent of discussions regarding the role of representative design (see, e.g., Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004;Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995;Hoffrage & Hertwig, 2006). In the 1970s and 1980s, research focused on many biases and illusions in judgment and decision making, most prominently in the Bheuristics and biases^program of Kahneman and Tversky and their collaborators (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;Pohl, 2017).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 62%

“…It might, moreover, be clear that a sample is never perfectly representative of the domain, even if randomly selected (as, e.g., in the two unintended conditions with recognition validity at chance level reported in the Introduction), but on average it will be close to being representative. Besides, there are myriads of potentially deviating features, like number, values, distributions, correlations, and validities (Hoffrage & Hertwig, 2006), which one would need to check. Some of these may also be difficult if not impossible to observe and evaluate (Fiedler, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

et al. 2017

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According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success-and thus usefulness-of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set's recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain's recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain's recognition validity, not on the set's recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 62%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

et al. 2017

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“…Cues k differ in their validity v i : research on judgments in the tradition of Brunswik () defined validities as Pearson correlations between cue and criterion or linear regression weights of a set of cues (Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, ) if the interdependence of cues is taken into account (see Hogarth & Karelaia, ; Karelaia & Hogarth, , for recent reviews). Deviating from this standard, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting () defined the cue validity of cue i as the conditional probability of one option having a higher criterion value than the other—given that the cue is present for this option and absent for the other—in a reference class (Hoffrage & Hertwig, ); or formally (Lee & Cummins, , p. 344):

v_{i} \equiv p ((), A > B true| a_{i} = 1, b_{i} = 0) .

…”

Section: Cue Validities and Cue Weightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Identify Strategy Use and Adaptive Strategy Selection: The Crucial Role of Chance Correction in Weighted Compensatory Strategies

Glöckner

2016

Behavioral Decision Making

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Model comparisons based on choices are a common method to assess adaptive strategy selection models. We show that one common methodological choice prevailing in parts of this work makes it hard to draw sound conclusions concerning the central questions of how often people indeed use simplified strategies (e.g., fast-and-frugal heuristics) and whether they select between them adaptively. Conclusions from this work are biased insofar that more complex weighted compensatory strategies, such as Franklin's Rule, that are considered alternatives to fastand-frugal heuristics are specified in a way that leads to a systematic underestimation of the degree to which they are relied on. Specifically, the common practice of not correcting cue validities for chance level results in a substantial disadvantage for weighted compensatory strategies. Model recovery simulations and a reanalysis of published data correspondingly show overestimation of the reliance on fast-and-frugal heuristics for various environments used in prominent studies. Furthermore, our results indicate that the magnitude of this overestimation is contingent on the structure of the environment so that strategy selection is mimicked without any material basis. As a result, even completely rational individuals would be erroneously classified as adaptive users of simple strategies. We recommend that chance corrected implementations of weighted compensatory strategies should be included in all future studies investigating the usage of adaptive strategies and argue that comprehensive re-analyses of previous work are warranted.

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“…Without redoing that discussion, what is noteworthy in the literature is that most researchers balance between “correspondence” (representative and externally consistent) and “coherence” (systematic and internally consistent). Trying to find a useful “hybrid” middle ground between these extremes is a solution that was in fact already proposed by Brunswik himself (1944), and recently once again advocated by Hoffrage and Hertwig (2006: 403).…”

Section: Research Design Data Collection and Operationalizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational risk assessments by supply chain professionals: Process and performance

Tazelaar

Snijders

2012

J of Ops Management

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a b s t r a c tWe consider the "process-performance paradox" in the assessment of operational risks by professionals in the field of operations and supply chain management (OSCM). The paradox states that although professionals with more expertise tend to decide in different ways, they often do not make better assessments than those with less expertise. We first replicate that this paradox exists in a context of the assessment of operational supply risks, and then show how the paradox can be understood as the consequence of process characteristics mediating the relation between expertise and assessment performance.Using an experimental setup, we had 234 OSCM-professionals assess the operational risk in two series of different business cases, and measured several characteristics of their decision-making process. The strength of our approach lies in the fact that the business cases were real-life cases from our database of purchasing transactions in the area of IT-purchasing. This allows a comparison of the risk assessments of the professionals with the actual supply risk as was known from the survey database. Our findings show that, contrary to what is often assumed, the OSCM-professionals with more expertise do not use less information while assessing, nor are they faster. Instead, our results show that specialized expertise goes with increased certainty about the assessments, and general expertise goes with an increased use of intuitive judgment. However, the net effects of these expertise characteristics on assessment performance are zero. In the case of specialized expertise this is because specialized expertise is itself negatively related to performance. In the case of general expertise this is because the net effects of the use of intuition on performance are zero.

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Which World Should Be Represented in Representative Design?

Cited by 10 publications

References 58 publications

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

How to Identify Strategy Use and Adaptive Strategy Selection: The Crucial Role of Chance Correction in Weighted Compensatory Strategies

Operational risk assessments by supply chain professionals: Process and performance

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