Which emission reduction mode is the best under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism?

Líu, Hao; Kou, Xiaofei; Xu, Gangyan; Qiu, Xuan; Liu, Haibin

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128053

Cited by 58 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Zhou et al [ 37 ] studied the competing manufacturers’ optimal joint pricing under the carbon tax and carbon subsidy and provided help for firms in pricing under supply chain competition. Liu et al [ 48 ] compared the consumer surplus of the manufacturer’s emissions reduction model, the retailer’s emissions reduction model, and the joint emissions reduction model. They found that the joint emissions reduction model’s emissions reduction level is the highest.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Shen

Lin

Cheng

2022

IJERPH

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To achieve the goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, the low-carbon transformation (LCT) of high-carbon firms is inevitable. We construct game models of a supply chain with different dominant types under a mixed carbon policy that embraces carbon cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Solving each dominant model, we derive the effective area and optimal threshold of the mixed carbon policy to guide LCT. We find that the selling price, market demand, and profit of the supply chain system are equal in different dominant models due to the mixed carbon policy, but when a company dominates the supply chain, its profit is higher than when it is a subordinate. In addition, the high-carbon manufacturers (HCM) will pursue LCT only when the sum of the carbon tax rates and carbon trading prices is within a certain threshold, and the subordinate HCM are more likely to be driven to pursue LCT. Therefore, the government should adopt a differentiated hybrid carbon policy, setting a high (low) carbon tax rate for the HCM in a dominant (subordinate) position.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Shen

Lin

Cheng

2022

IJERPH

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“…They found that manufacturer subsidy induces higher investments in carbon emission-reducing technology and consumer subsidy induces the higher net emission. Liu et al ( 2021a ) studied three different carbon emission reduction modes under the cap-and-trade mechanism. They found that joint emission reduction mode by the manufacturer and the retailer leads to the highest emission reduction level, consumer surplus, and social welfare.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retailer-driven carbon emission reduction: contract design in the presence of information asymmetry and cap-and-trade

Zhao

2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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This study considers a supply chain consisting of a dominant brand-name retailer and a manufacturer in the presence of a cap-and-trade mechanism and consumers’ low-carbon preference. The retailer exerts advertising efforts, while lacks of the manufacturer’s private carbon emission reduction effort cost information. We construct the benchmark model with information symmetry and asymmetry respectively. We obtain all members’ equilibrium solutions and analytically examine the impact of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction effort cost, the retailer’s advertising effort cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on the supply chain members’ decisions. And then, we systematically compare two scenarios to obtain the condition in which the manufacturer would be willing to share the private information. With the aim of improving the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction effort level and all members’ economic performance, we further propose a two-part tariff contract for information symmetry and asymmetry, respectively.

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“…In competition, the retailer and the manufacturer both maximize their own profit. Several previous studies [3,8,42], have used the Stackelberg game model (Leader-follower) to study a manufacturer in a green supply chain under cap and trade regulation. Because, in our model, the manufacturer also has an online sales channel, it is reasonable to assess that the manufacturer should be play the lead role in decision making.…”

Section: Stackelberg Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and Coordination Strategies in a Dual Channel Supply Chain with Green Production under Cap and Trade Regulation

Taleizadeh

Shahriari

Sana³

2021

Sustainability

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In this paper, we consider a two level dual channel green supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer with a separate sales channel for the manufacturer. The manufacturer uses green technology in its production and is required to produce in accordance with the cap and trade regulation. Using game theory, we compare cases where members decide to compete or cooperate with each other in terms of pricing and production. Our main contributions are studying the dual channel supply chain model where a manufacturer is regulated by the cap and trade system, using green production and also on their decision as to whether to compete or cooperate with a value-adding retailer. We also investigated the impact of green production on lowering the amount of carbon emissions produced. In the present study, supply chain members are advised to cooperate with each other in order to achieve the environmental benefits of the cap and trade system and, to avoid market failure, we further recommend that manufacturers should invest in green technologies for their production.

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Which emission reduction mode is the best under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism?

Cited by 58 publications

References 37 publications

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Retailer-driven carbon emission reduction: contract design in the presence of information asymmetry and cap-and-trade

Pricing and Coordination Strategies in a Dual Channel Supply Chain with Green Production under Cap and Trade Regulation

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