Where Value Resides: Making Ecological Value Possible

Abstract

Distinguishing between the source and the locus of value enables environmental philosophers to consider not only what is of value, but also to try to develop a conception of valuation that is itself ecological. Such a conception must address difficulties caused by the original locational metaphors in which the distinction is framed. This is done by reassessing two frequently employed models of valuation, perception, and desire, and going on to show that a more adequate ecological understanding of valuation emerges when these models are fully contextualized in the intersecting life worlds of the ecological community. Ecological evaluation takes place in ongoing encounters between these worlds and a crucial part in this process is assigned to

Nature Is Beyond Value Because We Are Part of Nature

“…Recognising that nature is beyond human values does not imply any worthlessness of or indifference to nature. Nor does it necessarily imply other beings have no ability to value (Greaves and Read 2015). Rather, it means affirming our belonging to worlds larger than humanity while recognising that values about nature are products of society.…”

“…The complexity of thousands to millions of interactions among micro-organisms in a cubic centimetre of soil should suffice to crush any claim to full comprehension of any natural phenomenon. What is therefore valued cannot be nature, since to value implies not only intentionality and sentience, but knowledge and understanding (Greaves and Read 2015). We should harbour no such illusions of grandeur about our relationship with the rest of nature.…”

“…After all, there is no difference between living and dead in the world of "actants" or other fashionable attempts at directing attention away from relations of power. ForGreaves and Read (2015), the crucial issue is sentience and intentionality, but the criteria to determine these attributes remain social and cannot be imputed to the organisms themselves without resorting to problems of communicability. To state the obvious, the conversation and publications on values and ethics are not being vetted by organisms other than people, and usually a tiny number of people at that.…”

From Shared Enaction to Intrinsic Value. How Enactivism Contributes to Environmental Ethics

“…The groundwork informing our idea of enacted value which we are due to set forth later on has been laid by the insightful paper by Greaves and Read (2015). They articulate the idea of an ecology of value characterized by two major theoretical posits: first, values emerge from interactions between at least two living creatures, thus they cannot reside in just one individual; second, values are not things or objects; instead, if articulating their ontological status is of any significance, they are "events" brought forth as part of the processes or interactions between living creatures.…”

“…The central notions that make possible the whole theoretical construct proposed by Greaves and Read (2015) are openness to the world, and its specific, more advanced subtype, namely open-ended openness. Yet rather than being properly defined these notions are illustrated by means of examples.…”