Where do high growth political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea's “developmental state”

Kohli, Atul

doi:10.1016/0305-750x(94)90004-3

Cited by 228 publications

(149 citation statements)

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“…Johnson (1999) recalls the hostility with which his notion of a developmental state was received by Anglo-American economists (p.34) and discusses how the Japanese experience he described was 'inconvenient' for both sides of the ideological cold war divide (p.49). These debates have gradually shifted to an acceptance of the significance of the states' role, but the nature of this role continues to be argued over (Kohli 1994(Kohli , p.1269. As Evans says in his seminal book on embedded autonomy, the question is not how much state intervention, but 'what kind' (Evans 1995, p.10).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developmental States: A Review of the Literature

Routley

2012

SSRN Journal

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This paper conducts a review of the literature concerning developmental states, in order to identify gaps and suggest research questions which could be fruitful for the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Consortium to explore, within the remit of their proposed research programme. This literature review attends to three key questions about developmental states and the answers proposed to them within the literature, namely; what worked? Why did it work? And would it work elsewhere? It also examines an emerging literature suggesting other models of a developmental state more suited to contemporary circumstances, which focus more explicitly on development as a social phenomenon rather than as a purely economic one. These are of particular interest given ESIDs focus on inclusive development.The conclusions of the paper examine some of the gaps in the literature and suggest an agenda for future research which includes addressing questions around:How does the consensus of conducting developmental roles come about -and how is it sustained? Patrimonialism, personal rule, development and stability Role of education, especially higher/further education Importance of rural/agriculture policies

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developmental States: A Review of the Literature

Routley

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…The absence of a large number of redistributive groups led by a powerful intermediate class in South Korea can in turn be traced to Korea's social history and the nature of the Japanese colonial impact, which prevented these classes from developing or consolidating (Kohli 1994). The Japanese, unlike the British, did not rule through the creation of supporters and administrators within the local population.…”

Section: South Koreamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This kind of social engineering destroyed the power base of the landed elite. It transferred between a quarter and a third of arable land to Japanese entrepreneurs and corporations (Kohli 1994(Kohli , pp. 1277.…”

Section: South Koreamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The new political economy of corruption

Khan¹

Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century

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The shift in the interest of international agencies and of the World Bank, in particular in the 1990s towards issues of governance, is on the face of it long overdue. It appears that after a long hiatus, mainstream economists are returning to the political economy of growth in general and to the problems of policy implementation in particular. Evidently, the new consensus is to be welcomed as a huge improvement over the market theology of the 1980s. The state is now recognized as important, as are investments, and how effectively states and other non-state institutions, like financial institutions, work to create conditions conducive for investment must clearly have a l ot to do with explaining growth and in directing policy attention when growth is poor. On the other hand, the new consensus is resistant to taking into account the role of political power in general, and in particular in explaining the patterns of corruption in different countries and the effects of this corruption. This is not because the importance of political corruption is not recognized. Economic theorists working on corruption as well as the Bank and IMF, have explicitly recognized the importance of political corruption. Rather, the problem is that political corruption is difficult to model and the policy implications of identifying this problem is that politics has to be targeted, a prospect that is not attractive to international institutions unless the political reform can be presented in terms familiar to their Western funding constituency. This is why when the political underpinning of corruption has been discussed, the policy suggestions have been things like greater democratization or the encouragement of civil society participation in monitoring the state. Typically, economists and international agencies have shied away from trying to identify the classes and groups involved in corruption in different contexts, the consequences of their corruption in each case and the possible ways in which the political structure can be changed to change the magnitude or effects of corruption. We will argue that although economic models have made a contribution to our understanding of corruption, by leaving out the political determinants of corruption, these models are not just deficient but in many cases may be misleading. The required direction of reform may often be quite different from that suggested by the emerging models on corruption.This chapter is structured in the following way. In the first section we discuss definitions of corruption and some of the evidence which has underpinned the recent interest in the phenomenon. In the next section we examine a number of contemporary approaches to corruption, focusing on the Shleifer-Vishny (1993) model of the effects of corruption under different institutional arrangements, as an example of the direction of research based on game theory models. Finally, in the last section we look at the importance of class and group structure in determining incentives for different types of corruption, which we ...

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“…On the one hand, Eckert (1992) and Kohli (1994Kohli ( , 1997Kohli ( , 1999 Korea borrowed the developmental state approach to economic development from Japan and implemented it relatively successfully until it was hit by the Asian Financial crisis and serious doubts were raised about her political economy arrangement (sometimes described as "crony capitalism"). Although the authors of the World Bank (1993a) miracle report (see also Page 1994aPage & 1994b have attempted to downplay the role of the state in the extraordinary economic progress of East Asia and have tried to emphasise as well as interpret the success story of the East Asian NIC as a confirmation of its neoliberal policy (labelling the actual practices of the region as "market friendly"), the so called "revisionist school" has vehemently criticised the report (see Amsden 1994, Lall 1994, Perkins 1994, Rodrik 1994and Yanagihara 1994 Irrespective of these academic quarrels over the role of the state in East Asian development (which at times tends to become rather ideological), the theoretical dispute over the applicability of the market and state failures as arguments for and against interventionism in the economy and its development continue (see e.g.…”

Section: South Korean Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%