Whence Ontological Structural Realism?

Saatsi, Juha

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_22

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Since these structures need not reveal the "natures" the underlie our best theories, and the knowledge that they do provide is both fallible and revisable just as long as approximate structural continuity is preserved, ESR would seem to be the better scientific realist option. These considerations, finally, would seem to support many of the recent defenses offered on the behalf of ESR that raise analogous, if more general and less spacetime specific, themes (Morganti 2004;Saatsi 2008).…”

Section: Formalism Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 72%

“…The "no miracles" argument, in effect, would seem to constitute the main "realist" commitment of liberal ESR, for it holds that the approximate continuity of mathematical structure manifest over the history of any one science is not an accident, but is due to the "constraints" that reality imposes on our scientific endeavors (see Brading and Landry 2004 for a similar construal of ESR, and section 3). 1 Of course, all of the other forms 1 Saatsi (2008) has argued that a scientific realism requires more than mere approximate continuity, but should also explain the success of the earlier theory from the succeeding theory's vantage point. Yet, while quite correct as a final goal or heuristic of scientific realism, explanations of this sort would seem to require access to the ontology underlying these theories (or, at least, the succeeding theory's ontology), and the liberal form of ESR endorsed in this essay denies that this requirement is necessary to establish the success of ESR relative to its non-realist rivals-the reason being that the non-realist alternatives have no grounds for claiming a future directed convergence of approximate continuity over the course of science (see, sections 3 and 4).…”

Section: Osr and Liberal Esrmentioning

confidence: 97%

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On structuralism’s multiple paths through spacetime theories

Slowik

2011

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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This essay examines the underdetermination problem that plagues structuralist approaches to spacetime theories, with special emphasis placed on the epistemic brands of structuralism, whether of the scientific realist variety or not. Recent non-realist structuralist accounts, by Friedman and van Fraassen, have touted the fact that different structures can accommodate the same evidence as a virtue vis-à-vis their realist counterparts; but, as will be argued, these claims gain little traction against a properly constructed liberal version of epistemic structural realism. Overall, a broad construal of spacetime theories along epistemic structural realist lines will be defended which draws upon both Friedman's earlier work and the convergence of approximate structure over theory change, but which also challenges various claims of the ontic structural realists.The contemporary revival of structuralism in the philosophy of science can be traced to a host of early twentieth century structuralist approaches, principally, the philosophical speculation on the epistemology and ontology of mathematical physics put forward by Poincaré, Eddington, Weyl, Russell, and Cassirer, to name just a few. Given the structuralist's fixation on the mathematical and/or empirical structure of theories, as opposed to, say, the underlying theoretical entities alleged to bring about and sustain those structures, it is therefore not surprising that the underdetermination of structure quickly became a serious obstacle for the new program; e.g., Newman's critique of Russell (see footnote 10). That is, since more than one structure is liable to be consistent with the same evidence, a theory's structure is as underdetermined as its ontology (for, as is well known, several different sets of unobservable entities can be reconciled with the same observation basis). This essay will examine the current

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Section: Formalism Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 72%

Section: Osr and Liberal Esrmentioning

confidence: 97%

On structuralism’s multiple paths through spacetime theories

Slowik

2011

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…11 Saatsi (2010) voices similar doubts. The OSRist may argue that, unlike the "selective sceptic" (see Chakravartty 2003Chakravartty , 2007 who restricts his/her realist commitment to some of For what concerns the second question, OSRists often say that one should re-conceptualise the quantum domain in terms of physical structures as primitives, from which objects "emerge" as relational "nodes" (French 2006, 183).…”

Section: The Argument From Underdeterminationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Morganti¹

2011

Philos. of Sci.

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Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, "ontic" form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting. Matteo MorgantiDepartment of Philosophy University of Rome "Roma TRE" Via Ostiense, 234 00144 Rome Italy E-mail: mmorganti@uniroma3.it Word count: 4967 AbstractStructural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, "ontic" form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting.

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“…Solitamente tale giustificazione è presentata nella forma di una maggiore aderenza rispetto ai contenuti delle migliori teorie fisiche; affinché OSR si costituisca come una alternativa preferibile rispetto ad altre proposte -ESR su tutte -si richiede quindi che esso sia in grado di spiegare meglio quelle teorie. Il problema è che non è affatto chiaro sino a che punto ciò avvenga (Morganti [41], [42]; Saatsi [48]). Infine, un ultimo punto, strettamente legato a quello della giustificazione, riguarda il rapporto fra realismo strutturale ontico e il problema dell'interpretazione della meccanica quantistica.…”

Section: Tre Problemi Del Realismo Strutturale Onticounclassified

Realismo, Struttura, Informazione

Mariani

2017

INCONTRI

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In recent years, many scholars (Ladyman & Ross [39]; Floridi [25]; Bynum [9]) have been discussing the possibility of an ‘informational’ realism. The common idea behind these projects is that of taking the notion of ‘information’ as the central concept of both our scientific practice and our ontology. At the same time, many experts in Quantum Information Theory (Lloyd [40]; Vedral [53]; Chiribella, D’Ariano & Perinotti [14]) have developed the idea that it is possible to ground all our physical theories by following an information-theoretic approach. In what follows, I aim at showing that it is still not at all clear what does it mean to be an ‘informational realist’. Consequently, I show the reasons why I believe is misleading to talk about informational realism as something that could actually supersede the most common forms of realism, namely the standard ‘object oriented’ and the structural ones. Finally, I suggest that the only plausible way to define informational realism, and thus, more generally, to take a realist attitudine towards Quantum Information Theory, is that of assuming an epistemic and moderate structural position.

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Whence Ontological Structural Realism?

Cited by 7 publications

References 26 publications

On structuralism’s multiple paths through spacetime theories

On structuralism’s multiple paths through spacetime theories

Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Realismo, Struttura, Informazione

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