When voting no is not enough: Legislative brawling and obstruction in Korea

Abstract

Although legislative brawling is a common occurrence—with 365 cases reported across the world between 1990 and 2018—we have a limited understanding of why members of representative bodies engage in violence. Does the lack of institutionalization or the violent nature of some legislators cause such behavior? This article argues that legislators with intense policy preferences engage in costly actions, such as brawling, as a means of signaling their policy commitment. To validate this claim, this article examines legislators' participation in legislative brawling and filibusters in Korea before and after the adoption of a filibuster procedure. I find that extreme members engaged in brawling before the adoption of procedural reform, while they engaged in filibusters after the adoption. This transformation of brawlers into filibusterers suggests that legislative brawling does not necessarily indicate a violent nature of some legislators but rather a desire by legislators to signal their policy commitments.