When Type 2 Processing Misfires: The Indiscriminate Use of Statistical Thinking about Reasoning Problems

Abstract

Research on dual-process theories of judgment makes abundant use of reasoning problems that present a conflict between Type 1 intuitive responses and Type 2 rule-based responses. However, in many of these reasoning tasks, there is no way to discriminate between the adequate and inadequate use of rules based on logical or probabilistic principles. To experimentally discriminate between the two, we developed a new set of problems: rule-inadequate versions of standard base-rate problems (where base rates are made irrelevant). Across four experiments, we observed conflict sensitivity (measured in terms of response latencies and response confidence) in responses to standard base-rate problems but also in responses to rule-inadequate versions of these problems. This failure to discriminate between real and merely apparent (or spurious) conflict suggests that participants often misuse statistical information and draw conclusions based on irrelevant base rates. We conclude that inferring the sound use of statistical rules from normatively correct responses to standard conflict problems may be unwarranted when this kind of reasoning bias is not controlled for.

When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy

“…However, we would like to argue that our findings actually expand (and do not contradict) this notion. Indeed, given the more systematic nature of Type 2 reasoning, and as long as these judgments under uncertainty are not fully error-free ( Ferreira et al 2022 ), the accumulation of smaller but more systematic Type 2 deviations from the normative correct responses may naturally lead to increased mean error. In other words, bias in judgment under uncertainty may stem from Type 1 as well as Type 2 processing.…”

Overconfidence in the Cognitive Reflection Test: Comparing Confidence Resolution for Reasoning vs. General Knowledge

“…A different thing is to assume that, because of such differences, people realize that they are wrong. Underlying such differences might be true sensitivity to logical principles (for compelling evidence that conflict detection is related to knowledge of logical principles, see Burič and Šrol 2020;Frey et al 2017;Šrol and De Neys 2021), but sometimes it might be mere sensitivity to peripheral features of a problem, unrelated to logic (Aczel et al 2016;Ferreira et al 2022;Ghasemi et al 2023Ghasemi et al , 2022Klauer and Singmann 2013;Meyer-Grant et al 2022).…”