When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions

Abstract

An On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor protesting an abusive police o cial set o a wave of democratic uprisings throughout the Arab world. In rising up against their governments, the peoples of the Arab countries were confronting an age-old problem in political theory: When is it acceptable to rise up against an unjust authority?is question is not only of great importance to the peoples of the Middle East today but was also of profound interest to the American founders and, through them, has informed the very basis of modern constitutionalism. It is perhaps unsurprising then that many countries' constitutions allow the people to challenge or overthrow their governments under certain circumstances. But to date, little systematic and empirical analysis has been done on the prevalence of this so-called right to resist in national constitutions or on what motivates constitutionmakers to adopt such a right.is Article takes up the task. It presents an original dataset on right-to-resist provisions in all national constitutions written since 1781, tracing such provisions' historical trajectory and demonstrating how they have proliferated in recent decades.e Article moreover provides the rst-ever empirical exploration of why it is, exactly, that constitutionmakers give their people a constitutional mandate to overthrow or contradict their governing authorities-likely those very authorities elsewhere empowered by the same constitution. Drawing on a range of real-world examples as well as regression analysis, we show that right-to-resist provisions are most likely to be rst established following a disruption of the previous constitutional order, either through popular democratic transition or through a violent political break such as coup d' état. ese ndings suggest that the constitutional right to resist serves a dual function, depending on its context. On the one hand, the constitutional right to resist can represent a fundamentally democratic and forward-looking tool that constrains future government abuse, empowers the national citizenry, and acts as an insurance policy against undemocratic backsliding. On the other hand, the right can serve as a backward-looking justi cation for coupmakers who seek retroactive legitimacy for whatever political crimes placed them in a position to make a new constitution in the rst place. Which of these two functions prevails may be in large part regionally determined. Latin American constitutionmakers primarily adopted the right to resist in the aftermath of coups d' état, while in other parts of the world the right to resist UCLA LAW REVIEW 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184REV. (2013 functions as a precommitment device against undemocratic backsliding.Our ndings have signi cant implications for our broader understanding of constitutionalism. Ostensibly, at the heart of any constitution lies a wish to bind the future on behalf of the present. Yet our ndings suggest that, at least in some cases, constitutional provisions may also serve the function of reinterpreting and j...

The revolution from antiquity till 18th century

“…1 'In Bronze Age China, notions of legitimate popular uprisings served as an important potential curb over otherwise formidable imperial authority'. 7 The teachings of the great philosopher Confucius (551-479 BC) and Mencius (c. 300 BC) are typical. 'Within Confucian thought, the idea of a right to resist that inhered in the people is typically associated with Mencius'.…”

“…'Within Confucian thought, the idea of a right to resist that inhered in the people is typically associated with Mencius'. 7 The Chinese philosophy was influenced by the Mandate of Heaven, which was essentially an ancient kind of social contract between the monarchs and their subjects, which obliged the monarchic power to govern properly and fairly. The violation of the Mandate of Heaven produced a legitimate right of reaction to power.…”

“…10 17 And my clothes to the naked: and if I saw any of my nation dead, or cast about the walls of Nineve, I buried him. 7 See Genesis Chapter 38 about Judah and Tamar (Daube 1972:13-14). 8 'Pharaoh ordered the Hebrew midwives to kill all male newborn immediately on delivery.…”

Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow

“…Social science research may establish that the market for votes is not a spot market and that liberals do not become conservatives overnight. 406 Still, campaign contributions can change votes sometimes, and sometimes may be enough to make the contributions worthwhile even apart from their effect in persuading voters.…”

“…Favoritism for donors may be more likely to affect less visible and less ideologically charged decisions. 408 Daniel Lowenstein has remarked that some social science researchers resemble "the fabled inebriate who searched for a lost key at 405 406 This research appears to supply a sufficient answer to the "public choice" economists who see contributors simply as buying legislators' votes. William Landes and Richard Posner describe what appears to be a common view among economists and taxi drivers:…”