When the Risk of Harm Harms

Abstract

ABSTRACT. This essay answers two questions that continue to drive debate in moral and legal philosophy; namely, 'Is a risk of harm a wrong?' and 'Is a risk of harm a harm?'. The essay's central claim is that to risk harm can be both to wrong and to harm. This stands in contrast to the respective positions of Heidi Hurd and Stephen Perry, whose views represent prominent extremes in this debate about risks. The essay shows that there is at least one category of risks -intentional impositions of risk on unconsenting agents -which can be both wrongful and harmful. The wrongfulness of these risks can be established when, on the balance of reasons, one ought not to impose them. The harmfulness of these risks can be established when the risks are shown to set back legitimate interests. In those cases where risks constitute a denial of the moral status of agents, risks set back agents' interest in dignity. In these ways, the essay shows that there are instances when a risk can constitute both a wrong and a harm.

On the Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm

“…To distinguish between the two, theorists often employ the terminology of 'risk-harm' to refer to the former, and 'outcome-harm' to refer to the latter (c.f. Finkelstein 2003;Placani 2016). As the central focus of the Harm View is risk-harm (constitutive or contingent), theorists must specify its two components: the currency and the measure of harm (Tadros 2016, p.175-200).…”

“…Some theorists have proposed appealing to a distinct currency of risk-harm. In particular, they assume a Feinbergian (1987) conception of harm and locate the constitutive harm of risk in how risk impacts risk-bearer's interests rather than her well-beingper se (Oberdiek 2012(Oberdiek , 2017Placani 2016). 20 This shift in focus avoids many problems the preference account faces.…”

“…4 For the purposes of this paper, I only focus on the preference and autonomy account. Other closely-related accounts that argue for the Constitutive Claim include Adriana Placani's (2016) dignity account, Jonathan Herington's (2019) and Seth Lazar's (2019) security account, and Maria Ferretti's (2016) freedom account. Wherever necessary, I've indicated where my discussion applies to these alternative accounts too.…”

“…5 For responses to these last two objections, C.f. Placani (2016). Others who also doubt the plausibility of the Harm View for different reasons include Judith Thomson (1986), Stephen Perry (2007, 2014, Joseph Bowen (unpublished ms.).…”

What’s Wrong with Risk?

“…Alternatively, Chloe may be harmed by a setback to objectively valuable goods regardless of her attitude towards them. For example, if dignity is objectively valuable, Nathan's drunk driving may harm Chloe by interfering with her dignity interests (Placani 2017). John Oberdiek has recently developed an alternative to The Harm Account.…”