When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge

Steinberg, Richard H.; Josling, Tim

doi:10.1093/jiel/6.2.369

Cited by 37 publications

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“…A coalition might, for example, use the potential for reduced commodity payments under WTO rulings as leverage to convince agribusiness and legislators to move from commodity payments to green payments through an expanded CSP. If conditions are right, the coalition might then gain support to bring agroforestry and other sustainable land-use 11 Prior to January 2004, the Peace Clause of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture had prevented the WTO from settling disputes between nations (like the US and Brazil) already largely in compliance with liberalization requirements (Steinberg and Josling 2003). 12 In July 2005 Brazil petitioned the WTO for permission to use the US's incomplete response to the suit as justification for imposing counter-retaliatory trade measures (WTO 2005).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating a political path to agroforestry through the Conservation Security Program

Lehrer

2008

Agroforest Syst

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Temperate agroforestry systems have faced obstacles to adoption despite their multiple environmental, economic, and social benefits. In part, these obstacles derive from the typically small scale of agroforestry systems relative to large-scale mainstream grain agriculture, which in the US is supported by strong commodity subsidies. One promising option for promoting agroforestry on a policy level, and thus for making it more appealing to landowners, is the Conservation Security Program (CSP), which provides payments to farmers for sustainable conservation practices on working lands. CSP was first passed in 2002 and has many supporters; however it has also faced opposition, delays in implementation and funding caps. CSP proponents have thus promoted its expansion in current and future Farm Bills. Since CSP is one part of the Farm Bill clearly suited to promoting agroforestry practices, supporters of agroforestry should consider joining coalitions around CSP to ensure that it includes explicit provisions for advancing agroforestry. In addition, CSP and agroforestry proponents alike should develop a strategic plan to market the expansion of CSP to policy makers. Specifically, a broad and strong coalition based on ideological common ground (e.g., attention to the notion of a family farmer) and on situational factors (e.g., potential international pressure from the World Trade Organization to reduce commodity subsidies) might be sufficient to push CSP into an expanded role in current and future Farm Bills.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating a political path to agroforestry through the Conservation Security Program

Lehrer

2008

Agroforest Syst

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“…A variety of analyses have demonstrated that, as in the EU case, a wide array of domestic support schemes for farmers in the US would likely become challengeable by third parties in the WTO after the expiration of the peace clause (Josling, et al 2006;Kennedy 2008;Porterfield 2006;Steinberg and Josling 2003;Sumner 2005). Consistent with our expectations, the US negotiating strategy was largely affected by legal vulnerability.…”

Section: Agriculture Negotiations and The Pending Expiration Of The Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under the standards established in the cotton case, it became clear that a wide array of farm subsidies provided under the 2002 Farm Bill would also be vulnerable to legal challenges. A variety of legal and economic analyses have noted that, on the basis of the standards set in the cotton case, policy tools created by the 2002 Farm Bill such as marketing loan program payments, counter--cyclical payments, and, to a lesser extent, direct payments could also become challengeable under the SCM Agreement on grounds that they cause serious prejudice to foreign competitors in the US domestic or international markets (Schnepf and Womach 2007;Steinberg and Josling 2003). 14 That Brazil's government was obviously also aware of this situation and, as a result, was keen on conveying the message that WTO litigation was a credible and powerful weapon at its disposal.…”

Section: Agriculture Negotiations and The Pending Expiration Of The Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in the Shadow of WTO Law: Why Litigate When You Can Negotiate

2015

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In the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant's bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant's preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant's bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant's non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round.

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“…The US and EC both negotiated voluntary export restraints in textiles and apparel products that restricted Chinese export growth over 2005-2008, thus preserving some foreign market access that other developing countries might have anticipated losing. Similarly, in the case of agriculture, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture contained a negotiated 'Peace Clause' (Steinberg and Josling 2003) designed to limit formal dispute-settlement activity in the sectorprovided certain economic conditions were met -until the end of 2003. Yet there is no evidence of a sharp increase in disputes over agriculture in 2004 following expiration of the Peace Clause.…”

Section: The Commercial Sectors Under Disputementioning

confidence: 99%

Developing countries, dispute settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law

Bown

McCulloch

2010

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development

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Critical appraisals of the current and potential benefits from developing country engagement in the WTO focus mainly on the Doha Round of negotiations. This paper examines a different aspect of developing country participation in the WTO: use of the WTO dispute settlement system to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated in earlier rounds of multilateral negotiations. We examine data on developing country use from 1995 through 2008 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to enforce foreign market access. The data reveal three notable trends: developing countries' sustained rate of self-enforcement actions despite declining use of the DSU by developed countries, developing countries' increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their access to the markets of developing as well as developed countries, and the prevalence of disputes targeting highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The paper also examines how introduction of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001 has affected developing countries' use of the DSU to self-enforce their foreign market access rights. A first pass at the data indicates that developing country use of the ACWL mirrors their use of the DSU more broadly; the ACWL has had little effect in terms of introducing new countries to DSU self-enforcement. A closer look at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing countries' ability to self-enforce foreign market access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade.WTO, dispute settlement, developing countries, ACWL,

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When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge

Cited by 37 publications

References 0 publications

Negotiating a political path to agroforestry through the Conservation Security Program

Negotiating a political path to agroforestry through the Conservation Security Program

Cooperation in the Shadow of WTO Law: Why Litigate When You Can Negotiate

Developing countries, dispute settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law

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