When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident

Åtland, Kristian; Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven

doi:10.1177/0967010609336201

Cited by 58 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The captain of Elektron, in agreement with its Russian owners, had other plans and decided to flee with the two Norwegian fisheries inspectors on-board. 85 From October 16 until October 19, four Norwegian Coast Guard vessels, as well as a maritime surveillance aircraft and several helicopters, closely tailed the trawler as it headed for Russian waters. The Norwegian Government considered using military force to halt the vessel by boarding it.…”

Section: Crises and Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the end, bad weather was blamed for not following through with the boarding. 86 It is also highly likely that Norwegian authorities were concerned with the escalation effects such actions could have vis-à-vis Russia. 87 The Elektron-incident was widely publicised, with coverage on Norwegian national television.…”

Section: Crises and Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At least, this was the case amongst Russian fishermen and their related shipowners, as well as amongst former fisheries officials and regional representatives in Murmansk. 107 At the national level, however, statements from both Norway and Russia have been constrained. Despite Russian complaints against Norwegian actions in the FPZ, these have not escalated beyond rhetoric and statements.…”

Section: Conflict Management In the Fpzmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…130 Officials in Murmansk and representatives from the fisheries industry have attempted to frame the dispute in the larger security relations between Norway and Russia, arguing that Russia is weak and does not protect its rights (compared to times under the USSR). 131 As Åtland and Bruusgaard show 132 , these attempts at "securitisation" were not successful in spurring the Russian government into escalating actions. Yet, they highlight how maritime disputes are not devoid of the intangible and symbolic elements that can lead to conflicts escalating beyond the dispute at hand.…”

Section: Conclusion: Conditions For Success?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

Østhagen

2018

Arctic Review

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Abstract:In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Svalbard, yet avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose. In the late 1990s, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regulations became stricter, as fish stocks were in decline. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow. In 1998, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue. Today, an event in the maritime zone is of concern to both Norwegian and Russian authorities. Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Whereas previous scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Svalbard and its maritime zones, or looked at how Norway manages fisheries in cooperation with Russia, this article brings forth new knowledge by examining the specific incidents in the Zone and placing these in the wider context of conflict theory. Limited to the Norwegian perceptions of the dispute only, this article adds to our understanding of this specific issue of Arctic conflict management and governance. Based on several years of data collection through interviews, the argument put forth is that Norwegian and Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative mechanisms, which in turn are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. In sum, we need to recognise how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.

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Section: Crises and Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Crises and Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conflict Management In the Fpzmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conclusion: Conditions For Success?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

Østhagen

2018

Arctic Review

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“…Second, securitization scholarship has been criticized on the grounds that it needs a more detailed methodological framework (Balzacq ). One of the main aspects of this criticism targets the bias in securitization scholarship toward the study of securitization success (Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard ; Salter :122; Wilkinson :95). Likewise, scholars also pointed to the need to clarify the meaning of securitization success (Abrahamsen ; Roe ; Vuori :70; Salter ; Bourbeau : 7, 18–28; Salter ).…”

Section: Securitization Scholarshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the Curious Absence of Israel

Lupovici

2014

Int Stud Rev

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Most discussions concerning how to evaluate theories make reference to empirical, methodological, logical, or normative criticisms. Less attention is given to how challenges in the theory itself affect the choice of cases. In this paper, I put forward the concept of observational criticism, which aims to trace biases in the empirical employment of a theory. While it overlaps with some of the criticisms mentioned above, observational criticism distinctly focuses on what we can learn about a theory through the prominence or absence of cases, or types of case, in the scholarship. To this end, I suggest a three‐stage approach for this criticism and I demonstrate each of these stages, as well as the utility of this framework, through a consideration of securitization scholarship—and more specifically of how securitization studies have overlooked the case of securitization moves in Israel. I suggest that although the concept of securitization has generated a great many studies on various theoretical and empirical issues, and despite the prominence of security discourse and practices in Israel, securitization scholarship has tended to avoid studying the securitization processes of this country. Following this mode of criticism, I argue that securitization theory could be more easily implemented in the case of Israel by, among other things, further clarifying the meaning of securitization success and its duration.

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Svalbard: International Relations in an Exceptionally International Territory

Grydehøj

2019

The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics

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When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident

Cited by 58 publications

References 16 publications

Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the Curious Absence of Israel

Svalbard: International Relations in an Exceptionally International Territory

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