The present study investigated the hypothesis that cooperation may occur as a result of strategic self-presentation that is instrumental for increasing personal gain. Individuals played a decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma game with a bogus partner. The prospect of future interaction with the partner, and the discernment of the partner (i.e., contingency in giving approval) were manipulated, and individuals were classified as scoring high or low on Snyder's self-monitoring scale. It was hypothesized that high self-monitors would exhibit more variability in cooperative behavior across social contexts and would be more cooperative with discerning partners and partners with whom they anticipated future interaction than would low self-monitors. As predicted, the prospect of future interaction with a partner increased the cooperation of the high, but not the low self-monitors. Cooperation was not related to attraction for the partner for either high or low self-monitors. Correlates of self-monitoring did not predict cooperation. These and other results were discussed in terms of individual differences in motives for cooperation and strategic self-presentation.