When less was more: external assistance and the political settlement in Somaliland

Abstract

The internationally unrecognized ‘Republic of Somaliland’ presents a case in which the domestic drivers of peace and development may be examined when aid and other forms of international intervention are not significant variables. The relative autonomy of its peace process offers an alternative perspective on post‐conflict transitions to that offered in the majority of the literature, which instead problematizes either the perverse outcomes or unintended consequences of international interventions in conflict‐affected areas. The purpose of this article is not to establish the salience of Somaliland's relative isolation in its ability to achieve peace and relative political order, as this is already documented in the literature. Rather, it explores the ways in which that isolation fostered mutual dependence between powerful political and economic actors for their survival and prosperity. It uses a political settlements framework to probe the implications of this dependence for western statebuilding interventions in post‐conflict situations. The findings present a challenge to orthodox assumptions about how states transition out of conflict, particularly that: greater vertical inclusivity necessarily strengthens a political settlement; effective Weberian institutions are a prerequisite of an enduring peace; and that external assistance is usually necessary to end large‐scale violence in developing states or to prevent a recurrence of the conflict.

Oil to cash in Somaliland: a debate whose time has come

“…She goes on to note that the ‘scarcity of international involvement in Somaliland's state formation has allowed for the process to reflect Somaliland society’ in a way that simply would not have been possible otherwise (Richards 2014: 176). Phillips (2016: 639–40) similarly emphasises that the political settlement in Somaliland ‘evolved without explicit externally driven expectations, schedules, or technical indicators of success’ which gave Somalilanders the freedom ‘to experiment with what was likely to work in the local context’. Extrapolating from this view, Somaliland's ‘hybrid mix’ of traditional and modern state elements has its quirks and contradictions but is a close reflection of Somali society.…”

Order beyond the state: explaining Somaliland's avoidance of maritime piracy

“…The population in the eastern areas is far less invested in the idea of an independent Somaliland than the predominantly Isaaq population of ‘middle’ Somaliland. The term ‘Somaliland’ is, therefore, not a neutral one, and is used almost exclusively by those who support its call for sovereign recognition – the majority of whom are from the Isaaq clan (Phillips 2016). Therefore, those who use the term Somaliland almost invariably adhere to the notion that Somalilanders are exceptional to other Somalis, and thus dismiss the notion that Somalilanders engage in piracy.…”

Twenty Years of de facto State Studies: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

“…Obviously, those de facto states dependent on external patrons such as Abkhazia (Russia), Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia), and the TRNC (Turkey) do receive substantial external assistance and are subject to the significant external intervention into their internal affairs that can come with it. Thus, this argument that nonrecognition affords de facto states significant freedom in their state-building choices is advanced most frequently in terms of Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008;Eubank, 2012;Phillips, 2016;Richards, 2014;Richards & Smith, 2015). Eubank (2012) argues that the lack of external assistance provided to Somaliland forced its leaders to depend on locally generated revenues.…”