When Islamists Lose: The Politicization of Tunisia's Ennahda Movement

McCarthy, Rory

doi:10.3751/72.3.11

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…This scholarly tendency has been reinforced by the recent framing adopted by the movement's leadership, presenting Ennahda as a party that left Islamism to enter "Muslim democracy" (Ghannouchi, 2016). At a 2016 party congress, Ennahda redefined itself through "functional specialization" (al-takhassus al-wazifi) as a political party, giving up its social, cultural, and preaching work (McCarthy, 2018b) and embracing an agonistic, pluralistic conception of politics (March, 2024). Founder-leader Rached Ghannouchi framed this development as a sequential differentiation, by which Ennahda formally ended its social, educational, cultural, and religious activities to focus solely on party politics.…”

Section: Connecting Daʿwa and Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining the distinction between religious and political activism in Islamism: evidence from the Tunisian case

Merone,

McCarthy

2024

Politics and Religion

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Tunisia's Islamist movement Ennahda has announced a separation of political and religious work, apparently reinforcing a “post-Islamist” argument that Islamic parties have left behind religious mobilization. However, the boundary between religious and political fields is highly porous. We ask why the distinction between religious and political activism remains a point of ambiguity within Islamism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 48 men and women who participated in the movement in the 1970s and 1980s in Tunis and Sousse, we develop a microlevel explanation of Islamist mobilization. We argue that religious and social Islamist activism is replete with political intent, which worked through three mechanisms: a counter-hegemonic ideology, an activist engagement in social transformation, and a formal organization. These findings add empirical insights to the case of Ennahda, provide leverage in explaining the politicization of Salafist movements, and underscore the legacy of asymmetric party capacities in shaping outcomes in a democratic transition.

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Section: Connecting Daʿwa and Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining the distinction between religious and political activism in Islamism: evidence from the Tunisian case

Merone,

McCarthy

2024

Politics and Religion

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“…According to the common people, an-Nahḍa indulged and promoted clientelism in the political arena, tailoring legislation for its own interests, and hiring relatives of its members in government institutions. an-Nahḍa showed lack of political culture and expertise, failing in the long run to balance political pragmatism and ambitions with the creation of an “Islamic alternative” (McCarthy, 2018; Pargeter, 2016). In September 2021, an-Nahḍa leadership even admitted its failure to manage the affairs of governance in Tunisia and acknowledged the mistakes it had committed since its entry into power, which contributed not only to fuel street anger against it, but also the decrease in the loss of seats in the more recent elections (Al-Arabiya, 2021).…”

Section: The Juridical and Political Framework Of The Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

‘How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Autocracy’: Kais Saied’s “Constitutional Self-Coup” in Tunisia

Tamburini

2022

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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The president of Tunisia, Kais Saied, recurred to Article 80 of the constitution on 25 July 2021 to proclaim the “state of exception,” freezing parliamentary activities, removing the representatives’ immunity, and dissolving the government headed by Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi. The following presidential decree 2021-117 on 22 September granted him legislative powers by decree, dismantling the constitution of 2014, which was the cornerstone of the result of the “Jasmine Revolution” of 2011. This article will analyze the constitutionality of the presidential decrees and shed light on the juridical, socioeconomical, and political circumstances that allowed Saied to perform what can be described as a constitutional coup or a self-coup, which reshaped the future of Tunisia.

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“…Supposing that an Islamist party is a vote-seeking actor whose primary goal is to exert a greater influence of Islam on the state by winning elections, then moderating its policies and ideological positions toward the center (or broader constituencies) is more desirable than other strategies (Schofield 2003). Despite varying degrees, Islamist parties in the Muslim world, such as the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD), and the Tunisian Ennahda, initially made large electoral gains by compromising their religious commitments with democratic credentials (Somer 2014;Daadaoui 2017;McCarthy 2018). In contrast, the electoral appeal of Islamist parties likely declines when normalization arises.…”

Section: O D E R a T I O N N O R M A L I Z A T I O N A N D E L E C T O R A L M O B I L I Z A T I O N O F I S L A M I S T P A R T I E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Stuck in Place? Normalization and the Changing Voter Profile of Indonesia's Islamist Prosperous Justice Party

Park¹

2021

J. East Asian Stud.

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Using the case of the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), I seek to measure the actual impact of Islamist parties’ moderation on their electoral performances and voter bases. Statistical analyses find that although PKS has experienced an influx of diverse voters since the early 2000s, the influx was offset by a gradual withdrawal of educated Islamist voters, who had been loyal to the party since its establishment. I further claim that this change in PKS's voter profile was attributable not to moderation per se but to normalization, manifesting in an adaptation of the party elites’ behaviors to the existing patterns in Indonesian politics. The party's recent policy shift with a conservative tone was insufficient to regain votes from its original supporters, who already saw PKS as a run-of-the-mill party. PKS's case implies that it is necessary for Islamist parties to maintain their distinctiveness as an alternative voice in the party system.

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When Islamists Lose: The Politicization of Tunisia's Ennahda Movement

Cited by 12 publications

References 13 publications

Explaining the distinction between religious and political activism in Islamism: evidence from the Tunisian case

Explaining the distinction between religious and political activism in Islamism: evidence from the Tunisian case

‘How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Autocracy’: Kais Saied’s “Constitutional Self-Coup” in Tunisia

Stuck in Place? Normalization and the Changing Voter Profile of Indonesia's Islamist Prosperous Justice Party

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