When Institutions No Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and Electricity in Germany, France and Britain

Abstract

A BST RA C T Many studies of privatisation and liberalisation in utility industries stress the importance of national institutions for reform. However, powerful transnational forces and cross-national policy convergence in telecommunications have led to a questioning of the role of institutions. Single sector studies are limited in their ability to assess the relative influence of sector-specific technical and economic forces in the policy process. This article presents a cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis of privatisation and liberalisation in telecommunications and electricity in Germany, France and Britain in terms of national institutions, techno-economic forces and ideas. Although institutions shape shorter-term policy responses and the emerging regulatory regimes, in the longer term their role is limited to the pace and timing of policy change rather than its impetus and direction. To understand the latter it is necessary to investigate sources of the key ideas which led to reform. The ideas were not embedded within institutions but originated from outside as a response of interests to techno-economic forces and from groups ideologically predisposed to favouring neo-liberal ideas.

Changing Frames of Reference and Regulatory Structures: French Airport Policy in Transition

“…Some academic literature is nevertheless more or less sceptical about the implementation of a French regulatory state as a result of European integration, and more specifically there is a literature that addresses the issue of French resistance to a regulatory shift (Bartle 2002;Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002;Jones and Cole 2009). However, there has been substantial movement in France toward a regulatory state model.…”

Privatização e processo decisório

“…Em uma análise posterior, porém, o próprio Thatcher (2003:26; tradução do autor) mostra que, na década de 1990, " […] desenvolvimentos econômicos e tecnológicos transnacionais, combinados com reformas pelo mundo, e o desenvolvimento de instituições suprana-cionais de regulação ofereceram um poderoso coquetel para rápida e abrangente convergência da reforma institucional". Bartle (2002) é outro autor que procura, por meio da análise de dois setores -telecomunicações e energia -, explorar a hipótese do impacto das instituições nacionais em oposição à hipótese da convergência entre setores. Tomando França, Alemanha e Inglaterra como casos paradigmáticos, Bartle oferece duas alternativas às explicações centradas nas instituições expostas por Thatcher e Hulsink.…”

“…A nova lei estendia o campo das empresas privatizáveis, mas mantinha grande parte das características da anterior, como a Comissão de Privatização, a venda de ações em condições especiais aos empregados e a restrição ao capital estrangeiro, e a versão francesa da golden share, as "ações de interesse específico" (Vauplane, 1995). Nessa época, o governo colocou a proposta da privatização da FT na agenda, apesar de mantê-la fora da lista das empresas privatizáveis contidas na lei, como fica claro no Relatório Roulet, encomendado por Gérard Longuet quando esteve à frente do Ministério dos Correios e Telecomunicações (Bartle, 2002).…”

Defining infrastructure integration: Abstract aspirations and institutional variations

“…The political economy is distinguished by a particular set of institutions that have created a 'socially embedded capitalism' that incorporates the market economy into the reaches of the state with a strong ethos of state-led social reform (Lehmburch, 2005). In describing Germany as a form of 'cooperative federalism' Bartle (2002) highlights the importance of "federalism, coalition government, a non-adversarial parliament and the active role of interest groups" (Bartle, 2002: 7). The federal constitution itself mandates to "ensure equal living conditions on the territory of the Republic" which has been interpreted as the foundation for Germany as a unitary federal state (Wollmann et al, 2010a).…”