When households stop logging — Evidence for household adaptation from East Kalimantan

Smajgl, Alex; Bohensky, Erin

doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2012.01.013

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In this Section we present a blockchain-based approach that presents land managers with incentivising payments to create new or maintain existing forests (Smajgl, 2016;Smajgl and Damen 2020). Deforestation is a key driver for the decline in global greenhouse gas mitigation potential (Smajgl and Bohensky, 2012). Several global efforts have aimed at stabilising the extent of forests as carbon sinks or even reversing the trend in forest loss, including the UN/World Bank coordinated REDD and the REDD + programs (Angelsen, 2008).…”

Section: A Blockchain-based Approach To Incentivize Forest Conservati...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing sustainability with blockchain-based incentives and institutions

Smajgl

Schweik

2022

Front. Blockchain

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Despite significant efforts over many decades, humanity faces daunting challenges in the governance, management and sustainability of natural resources. Perhaps the most obvious is our global inability to collectively act and control or reduce greenhouse gases that are warming the planet. Another example, occurring at finer geographic scales, is the overuse of groundwater aquifers. Institutions—defined in Political Science and Economics as formal and informal rules that guide and incentivize socio-economic activities—are humanity’s general approach toward addressing these and other environmental challenges. Institutional arrangements typically specify whom they apply to, under what circumstances, and what penalty the breaking of the rule involves. Effective institutional design requires the ability to properly incentivize human behavior in the context of socio-economic systems, and establish systems to monitor behavior and sanction when rules are broken. From time to time, technological advances come along that complement institutional designs and improve our ability to incentivize and monitor behavior. We believe that the invention of Blockchain or Distributed Ledger technology—increasingly touted as the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution–could provide new ways to incentivize behavior of resource users, establish innovative monitoring capacity, and help to avoid corrupt governmental behavior. In this Perspective article, we summarize Proof-of-Stake Blockchain technology and provide two examples—deforestation and groundwater management—to describe how this new revolution could provide new solutions for the sustainable management of natural resources at local to global scales.

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Section: A Blockchain-based Approach To Incentivize Forest Conservati...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing sustainability with blockchain-based incentives and institutions

Smajgl

Schweik

2022

Front. Blockchain

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“…In the early 2010s in areas where commercial timber became exhausted, rural communities and their business=politics partner coalitions moved on to other segments of the economy, notably plantations development (Smajgl and Bohensky 2012). However, in areas where timber remained a viable economic resource, illegal extraction continued (Obidzinski et al 2014a).…”

Section: Formalizing the Logging Sector In Indonesiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Formalizing the Logging Sector in Indonesia: Historical Dynamics and Lessons for Current Policy Initiatives

Obidzinski

Kusters²

2015

Society & Natural Resources

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This article reviews the Indonesian central government's efforts to regulate logging activities in historical perspective to draw lessons for the new timber legality verification system called SVLK. It shows that throughout history, illegal logging networks have been a fixture in Indonesia's forestry sector and that the involvement of local and national power holders has given logging activities a formal backing. The SVLK is expected to help improve forest governance, but since it is primarily an administrative tool there is a risk that preexisting trends and practices will continue. This underlines the need for anticorruption measures and independent monitoring to make the legality adherence system more robust and reliable.Illegal logging is cause for international concern, as it circumvents the laws set up to protect the environment and the rights of people (Lawson and MacFaul 2010). It includes logging from areas where extraction is not allowed, logging of protected species, extracting more than the allowable harvest, and logging of oversized or undersized trees (Casson and Obidzinski 2002). In response to concerns over the negative effects of illegal logging practices, national governments and international institutions have been taking measures to better regulate the logging sector. Over the last few decades, the emphasis has moved from centralized and top-down regulations toward decentralization, marketization, and increased involvement of

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The Parameterisation of Households in the SimPaSI Model for East Kalimantan, Indonesia

Smajgl

Bohensky

2013

Empirical Agent-Based Modelling - Challenges and Solutions

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When households stop logging — Evidence for household adaptation from East Kalimantan

Cited by 6 publications

References 39 publications

Advancing sustainability with blockchain-based incentives and institutions

Advancing sustainability with blockchain-based incentives and institutions

Formalizing the Logging Sector in Indonesia: Historical Dynamics and Lessons for Current Policy Initiatives

The Parameterisation of Households in the SimPaSI Model for East Kalimantan, Indonesia

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