When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks

Siegel, David A.

doi:10.1017/s0022381611000727

Cited by 129 publications

(119 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Modeling dissidents as a unitary actor does not allow addressing collective action problems (Lichbach 1995(Lichbach , 1998Olson 1965;Tullock 1971), coordination and information problems (Boix and Svolik 2009;Edmond 2013;Persson and Tabellini 2009;Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011), the role of vanguards (Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2013), the endogenous choice of the revolutionary agenda (De-Nardo 1985;Shadmehr 2014), the role of networks (Chwe 2000(Chwe , 2001Diani and McAdam 2003;Siegel 2011), coalition formation (Foran 2005;Parsa 2000), divisions among opposition groups (Lust-Okar 2005), scale shift (Tarrow and McAdam 2005), and mecha-nisms such as diffusion and contagion (Buenrosto, Dhillon, and Wooders 2007), brokerage (Diani 2003), certification, and boundary action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2004;Tilly and Tarrow 2007). The main limitations stem from two simplifying assumptions: unitary actors and limited time horizon.…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution: Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics

Shadmehr

2014

The Journal of Politics

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I develop a framework to study the interactions between dissidents and the state that reconciles political-process and grievance-based theories of protests and provides insights into interpreting the conflicting empirical studies that sometimes support one theory and sometimes the other. I show that contrary to the theoretical predictions of the literature, the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (e.g., the level of income inequality or economic hardship) and the likelihood of repression can be nonmonotone, and given some assumptions, is U-shaped. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases from low to high, the likelihood of repression first decreases and then increases. Indeed, the data suggest a nonmonotone, U-shaped relationship between the level of repression and income inequality. I also discuss the implications for the empirical studies of repression. publication. A similar relationship emerges if one simply averages the level of repression for intervals of inequality. 2 The estimation is over the range of inequality that includes about 90% of the data, consisting of 1,445 data points. The repression measure is CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). It is an additive index constructed from the sum of four indicators of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance collected for each country-year. Each indicator takes on one of the three values of 0, 1, and 2, corresponding to frequent, occasional, and no occurrence of the relevant incidence, respectively. I reverse the data so that our repression measure is an integer ranging from 0 (no violation of physical integrity rights) to 8 (the most frequent violation).

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Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution: Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics

Shadmehr

2014

The Journal of Politics

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“…Perceived repression plays a role in the relationship between each motive and political participation: it may increase grievances which invigorate participation (Almeida, 2005); it may also generate moral and social incentives to participate in protests (Opp, 1994(Opp, , 2009; or in interaction with the characteristics of social networks it may influence micro-mobilization (Loveman, 1998;Siegel, 2011). Perceived repression may instil fear or elicit anger among people.…”

Section: Micro-mobilization and Par Ticipation Motivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Perceived repression may instil fear or elicit anger among people. Decreasing or increasing willingness to participate depends on whether fear or anger spreads (Castells, 2012;Siegel, 2011); if fear spreads people withdraw from participation, if anger spreads they take to the streets (Klandermans et al, 2008).…”

Section: Micro-mobilization and Par Ticipation Motivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responses to Repression

Honari

2017

Sociopedia

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“…Note that in our model the social network is assumed to be complete. Siegel shows in several papers how in general the structure of the social network affects participation in collective action (Siegel 2009), the effect of repression on collective action (Siegel 2011) and how it interacts with mass media (Siegel 2013). Importantly, none of these papers studies the effect of different sorts of media on participation in revolts.…”

Section: Revolutions Under Different Information Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media

2017

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A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In this paper, we study its role in mobilization. We assume that social media allow potential participants to observe the individual participation decisions of others, while traditional mass media allow potential par- ticipants to see only the total number of people who participated before them. We show that when individuals' willingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts of media foster a successful revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private information, only social media ensure that a revolt succeeds, with mass media multiple outcomes are possible, one of which has individuals not participating in the revolt. This suggests that social media enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more than traditional mass media.

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When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks

Cited by 129 publications

References 38 publications

Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution: Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics

Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution: Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics

Responses to Repression

Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media

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