When Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapon State”?

Hymans, Jacques E. C.

doi:10.1080/10736700903484728

Cited by 21 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Still, determining that a state has crossed a line and proliferated is more complicated than observing a nuclear test. There are still questions among scholars about when a state should be considered a "latent nuclear power," "nuclear-capable," or a "nuclear-weapon state" (Hymans 2010;Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015). In the NPT environment, some states that acquired nuclear weapons have also never carried out a verified nuclear test.…”

Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Herzog

2020

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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Horizontal nuclear proliferation presents what is sometimes referred to as the "Nth country problem," or identifying which state could be next to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear fuel cycle technologies can contribute to both nuclear power generation and weapons development. Consequently, observers often view civilian nuclear programs with suspicion even as research on nuclear latency and the technological inputs of proliferation has added nuance to these discussions. To contribute to this debate, I put forth a simple theoretical proposition: En route to developing a civilian nuclear infrastructure and mastering the fuel cycle, states pass through a proliferation "danger zone." States with fuel cycle capabilities below a certain threshold will likely be unable to proliferate. States that pass through the "danger zone" without proliferating will be unlikely to do so in the future. I support this proposition by introducing preliminary analysis from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) Index, a new heuristic tool to complement political assessments of the connection between civilian nuclear energy development and nuclear weapons proliferation. I conclude with policy implications for contemporary Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Taken together, this article calls for increased policymaker interaction with historical cases and more sophisticated academic engagement with the nuclear fuel cycle.

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Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Herzog

2020

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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“…The debate over when a state is rightly called a “nuclear-weapon state” is in part a function of technology. Jacques Hymans (2010) considers both the nuclear test and the possession of significant quantities of fissile materials as alternative material indicators. He concludes that both indicators have problems but the nuclear test is ultimately the best indicator for “nuclear weapon stateness,” particularly if the state’s incentives for conducting a nuclear test are taken into consideration (176).…”

Section: Existing Approaches To Nuclear Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Law as discursive resource: the politics of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Hamidi

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Realist approaches to international law conceptualize the law as epiphenomenal to state interest, whereas liberal institutionalist approaches theorize the ability of law to curb state power. Through the example of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this article challenges these approaches by arguing that law’s power comes from its productive and constitutive effects. Despite perennial conflict, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons endures because it has ordered nuclear politics by constituting a legal distinction between “nuclear weapon states” and “non-nuclear weapon states.” Instead of assuming that this distinction reflects self-evident material differences, this article shows how states actively construct nuclear status through international law. The dynamics of this construction reflect significant actions on the behalf of conventionally disempowered states and not merely great powers. An analysis of the meeting documents of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee finds that the participants used the forum to perform a burgeoning “non-nuclear” identity. The politics of this distinction also generated the discourse of “nuclear apartheid,” which was subsequently used by states outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime to justify their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Taken together, the role of non-nuclear diplomacy and the discourse of nuclear apartheid demonstrate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not simply endure because the powerful have sanctioned it, but because it created a space for the disempowered to expand their influence from below. Though the article builds on existing sociological approaches to the law, it also moves beyond conflicts over legal and textual interpretation to demonstrate the diplomatic practices around the constitution of legal categories.

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“…In this work, the network science formalism encourages a typology of proliferation determinants as factors internal and external to the state, where internal factors are properties of nodes (i.e., domestic properties of states) and external factors are properties of edges (i.e., relationships between states). Those factors internal to states that have been theorized to impact proliferation decisions include indigenous nuclear capabilities, domestic political structure, regime type, identity-based considerations, and leadership psychology (Gartzke and Kroenig 2009;Way and Weeks 2014;Rublee 2009;Hymans 2010). External factors theorized to drive a state's desire for nuclear weapons include armed conflicts, military alliances, economic sanctions, international trade, membership in international institutions, nuclear rivalry, and the international transfer of nuclear technology and knowledge (Sagan 1997;Jo and Gartzke 2007;Fuhrmann 2009b;Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010;Haggard and Noland 2010;Miller 2014;Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014b;Solingen 1994;Potter 2010;Singh and Way 2004).…”

Section: The Determinants Of Nuclear Proliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The nuclear network: multiplex network analysis for interconnected systems

et al. 2019

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States facing the decision to develop a nuclear weapons program do so within a broader context of their relationships with other countries. How these diplomatic, economic, and strategic relationships impact proliferation decisions, however, remains under-specified. Adding to the existing empirical literature that attempts to model state proliferation decisions, this article introduces the first quantitative heterogeneous network analysis of how networks of conflict, alliances, trade, and nuclear cooperation interact to spur or deter nuclear proliferation. Using a multiplex network model, we conceptualize states as nodes linked by different modes of interaction represented on individual network layers. Node strength is used to quantify factors correlated with nuclear proliferation and these are combined in a weighted sum across layers to provide a metric characterizing the proliferation behavior of the state. This multiplex network modeling approach provides a means for identifying states with the highest relative likelihood of proliferation-based only on their relationships to other states. This work demonstrates that latent conflict and nuclear cooperation are positively correlated with proliferation, while an increased trade dependence suggests a decreased proliferation likelihood. A case study on Iran's controversial nuclear program and past nuclear activity is also provided. These findings have clear, policy-relevant conclusions related to alliance posture, sanctions policy, and nuclear assistance.

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When Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapon State”?

Cited by 21 publications

References 18 publications

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Law as discursive resource: the politics of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The nuclear network: multiplex network analysis for interconnected systems

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