When Do Religious Leaders Support Faith-Based Violence? Evidence from a Survey Poll in South Sudan

Abstract

Religion has increasingly become important in conflicts worldwide. Religious leaders may play a key role in mobilizing believers as they can call for peace or instigate violence. But what makes religious leaders support peace or promote violence? Drawing on a survey poll of 102 religious leaders in Juba, South Sudan, this paper represents virtually the first attempt to study the correlates of pro-violence opinions of religious elites in a more quantitative manner in a developing country. The paper analyzes when and why some religious leaders support faith-based violence while others do not. Employing a unique combination of innovative measures, our results have many implications for mobilization processes. We find that leaders' support for faith-based violence is largely independent of individual demographic or personal determinants but is closely related to religious attitudes. Tolerance toward other faiths and secularism reduce pro-violence attitudes. Muslims seem to be more ready to support faith-based violence, probably given their minority status and other peculiarities of Islam in (South) Sudan. Surprisingly, interreligious activities do not reduce support for violence but increase appreciation for peaceful protest. Generally, determinants of peaceful protest substantially differ, suggesting that any support for violence follows its own distinct logic.

Why Religious People Support Ethnic Insurgency? Kurds, Religion and Support for the PKK

“…Reynal-Querol (2002) argues that the commonality in religion does not breed political violence. On the other hand, Leng and Regan (2003), Fox (2004), Tusicisny (2004), Collier et al (2004), and Basedau and Koos (2015) differ in their views on the relationship between religion and political violence from the no-relationship findings. Fox (2004) claims that differences in religious identities among members of a rebel group may distort communication and therefore serve as an obstacle to a peaceful settlement of conflicts.…”

“…Fox (2004) claims that differences in religious identities among members of a rebel group may distort communication and therefore serve as an obstacle to a peaceful settlement of conflicts. Basedau and Koos (2015) and Basedau et al (2016) suggest that religious grievances and the way religious elites frame these grievances and these grievances' overlapping with other identities exert significant influence on the onset and duration of the conflict. Leng and Regan (2003) assert that religious identity is fixed, and thus associated disputes are more difficult to negotiate than ethnic and linguistic conflicts.…”

“…On the other hand, others are skeptical about a positive relationship between religious similarities and the conflict and contend that the effect of religion may be conditional upon other factors. For example, some highlight elites' abilities to frame religious grievances effectively (Basedau and Koos 2015; Basedau et al 2016) while Sarıgil and Fazlıoglu (2013) and Gurses (2015) concur that religion is no cure for civil war in their work on Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Furthermore, Gurses and Rost (2017) show in their large-N study that co-religiosity does not reduce the duration of peace after an ethnic civil war and even increase the likelihood of the recurrence of the conflict.…”

Killing for God? Factional Violence on the Transnational Stage

“…Religious ideology and characteristics specific to religious beliefs have been found to make followers more inclined toward violence (e.g., Juergensmeyer 2003). Relatedly, religious attitudes predict religious leaders’ support for faith-based violence (Basedau and Koos 2015). Among religious organizations, specific characteristics more likely to be associated with such organizations predict violence better (e.g., Asal, Schulzke, and Pate 2016), as does how a religious group views political authority (Philpott 2007).…”

The correlates of religion and state: an introduction

“…To analyse this relationship, they use RAS3 in combination with the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict data and two datasets collected by Basedau: the Religion and Rebels dataset (Basedau, 2017) and the RCDC dataset (Basedau, et. al., 2016).…”