When Diversity Works: The Effects of Coalition Composition on the Success of Lobbying Coalitions

Abstract

Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.

The politics of platform capitalism: A case study on the regulation of Uber in New York

“…It did so in the spirit of analytic eclecticism, pragmatically utilizing and recombining concepts from different research traditions to tell a complex causal story about a concrete problem that real-world actors face. Based on a case study on the regulation of Uber in New York, it has developed and defended the claim that the size and diversity of coalitions explain the success or failure of regulatory attempts (Junk, 2019); that the composition of coalitions is influenced by the ability of actors to use narratives as coalition magnets (Béland and Cox, 2016); and that their simultaneous power and vulnerability both help and harm platform companies like Uber (Culpepper and Thelen, 2019). Not incidentally, both Tusk and de Blasio drew very similar conclusions from their respective victories, stressing the importance of "better narratives" (Tusk, 2018, p. 109), of "broad coalitions" and of fact-based but morally appealing "arguments" (Blasio, 2018).…”

The two faces of conflict: how internal and external conflict affect interest group influence

“…Second, our limiting of 'lobby camps' to NGOs versus business organizations, limits the generalizability to other types of lobby camps. For example, there are cases in which lobby camps consist of NGOs and business groups (Beyers & De Bruycker, 2018 ;Junk, 2019). It is unclear whether the same mechanisms we identified in this paper apply to these types of camps as well.…”

“…Internal conflict, instead, refers to conflict among business groups or among a set of NGOs. While we recognize that business groups and NGOs also form coalitions among each other and sometimes share a common position (Junk, 2019), this is by far a minority in the EU (our case). Beyers and De Bruycker (2018, p. 972) highlight that only 9 per cent of the NGOs active around a random set of 70 legislative proposals in the EU participated in such heterogeneous coalitions, and only 6 per cent of the business groups participated in such coalitions.…”

“…Baumgartner et al, 2009;Dür et al, 2015), the salience of issues (cf. Junk & Rasmussen, 2019;Junk, 2019;De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019), the position in the policy cycle in which the lobbying takes place (cf. Bevan & Rasmussen, 2020), and the level of public support (cf.…”

Lobbying during government formations: do policy advocates attain their preferences in coalition agreements?

“…Advocates often formed coalitions when sending letters, most likely in order to signal the broad support for their requests. Previous studies show mixed or conditional effects of coalitions on preference attainment (Junk 2019;Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004). To control for the possibility that these coalitions affect the preference attainment of advocates, the analyses include a control for coalition size, which is a count of the number of advocates that sent a specific letter.…”