When Cognitive Control Is Not Adaptive

Abstract

In order to engage in goal-directed behavior, cognitive agents have to control the processing of task-relevant features in their environments. Although cognitive control is critical for performance in unpredictable task environments, it is currently unknown how it affects performance in highly structured and predictable environments. In the present study, we showed that, counterintuitively, top-down control can impair and interfere with the otherwise automatic integration of statistical information in a predictable task environment, and it can render behavior less efficient than it would have been without the attempt to control the flow of information. In other words, less can sometimes be more (in terms of cognitive control), especially if the environment provides sufficient information for the cognitive system to behave on autopilot based on automatic processes alone.

Toward a Functional View of the p Factor in Psychopathology

“…Both modes have value in the appropriate contexts (Block & Block, 1980; Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014; Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013). For example, model-free functioning is more adaptive than is model-based functioning in environments that are unpredictable (e.g., Tops, Boksem, Luu, & Tucker, 2010), and where the future availability of resources is unknown (e.g., Del Giudice, 2014).…”

The system neurophysiological basis of non‐adaptive cognitive control: Inhibition of implicit learning mediated by right prefrontal regions

“…In most experimental paradigms, cognitive control is adaptive because subjects have to overcome the automatic activation of an incorrect response triggered by an irrelevant feature which is similar or identical to those that need to be attended [Botvinick et al, 2001]. In this context, Bocanegra and Hommel [2014] showed that a predictive feature (an implicit S-R contingency that the study participants were unaware of), which was clearly task-irrelevant but would nevertheless improve performance if (automatically) taken into account, improved task performance only when participants performed the task rather automatically (i.e., with little cognitive control requirements) but not when they had been required to exert high levels of cognitive control (which actually had a detrimental effect on performance). In this context, Bocanegra and Hommel [2014] showed that a predictive feature (an implicit S-R contingency that the study participants were unaware of), which was clearly task-irrelevant but would nevertheless improve performance if (automatically) taken into account, improved task performance only when participants performed the task rather automatically (i.e., with little cognitive control requirements) but not when they had been required to exert high levels of cognitive control (which actually had a detrimental effect on performance).…”

How emotion-cognition interactions drive affective bipolarity

“…A conjecture guides the perceptual search process by acting as a task set (e.g. see Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014;Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977;Wolfe, 2012). When a search attempt succeeds at finding a matching phenomenal experience, this is called a confirmation event.…”

“…An anomaly initiates the memory search process by acting as a retrieval cue (e.g. see Bocanegra & Hommel, 2014;Davelaar & Raaijmakers, 2012;Sternberg, 1969). When a search attempt fails to retrieve a matching conceptual interpretation, this is called a falsification event.…”