When Aristotelian virtuous agents acquire the fine for themselves, what are they acquiring?

Is Aristotelian friendship disinterested?: Aristotle on loving the other for himself and wishing goods for the other's sake

“…Second, 8.13.1162b34-1163a1 contrasts the beneficial with the fine (to kalon), and 5.9.1136b20-22 and 9.8 suggest that the virtuous person will give up various beneficial goods for the fine, on account of the latter's superlative value. For an argument suggesting the coextensiveness of the fine and virtuous activity in these contexts, see Kim (2020). (2) Parallel to NE 8.10.1160a36-b9, Politics 3.6.1278b39-1279a4 says that in correct constitutions, ruling is on account of itself for the subject's sake but only accidentally for the ruler's sake.…”

“…Common opinion reports that this is due to the benefactor expecting a return of utility from the beneficiary, and the beneficiary being begrudging of this debt of utility (1167b17-25). But Aristotle denies this explanation and explicitly sets aside utility in his own explanation (1167b28-33), which instead appeals to how the beneficiary is involved in the benefactor's activity (1167b33-1168a9; for more discussion, see Kim (2020)). Again, Aristotle sets aside utility yet discusses the instrumental facilitation of activity.…”