When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing

Rapoport, Anatol; Qi, Hang; Mak, Vincent; Gisches, Eyran J.

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.015

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…In recent decades, because of the advantages of lower costs and better control of both context and game settings (Chan et al 2021, Dixit et al 2017, Johnsen et al 2021, numerous experiments have been designed to study travel choice problems such as route choice (Ben-Elia and Shiftan 2010, Ben-Elia et al 2013, Helbing et al 2002, Lu et al 2011, Rapoport et al 2009, Rapoport et al 2014a,b, Selten et al 2007, Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999, to name a few), departure-time choice (Daniel et al 2009, Gabuthy et al 2006, Ramadurai and Ukkusuri 2007, Sun et al 2017, Ziegelmeyer et al 2008, and mode choice (Chidambaram et al 2014, Innocenti et al 2013, Liu et al 2015, Rapoport et al 2019, Sunitiyoso et al 2011. The main contexts examined in the literature include information (Ben-Elia and Avineri 2015, Ben-Elia et al 2013, Helbing et al 2002, Lu et al 2011, Rapoport et al 2014a, Selten et al 2007, Srinivasan and Mahmassani 1999, incentives Ben-Elia 2018, Rey et al 2016), paradoxes (Mak et al 2018b, Morgan et al 2009, Rapoport et al 2009), social interactions (Sunitiyoso et al 2011, Zhang et al 2018, and others not mentioned in this study.…”

Section: Behavior Experiments In Transportation Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection

Han

Jia

et al. 2021

Production and Operations Management

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In a transportation system with multiple equilibria, coordination failure occurs when a group of travelers could achieve the efficient equilibrium but fail because they cannot coordinate their decision‐making under strategic uncertainty. This study investigated factors that might affect coordination behavior in mode choice with both positive and negative externalities. Subjects participated in a mode‐choice game in which they were required to choose between public transport and private car. Positive or negative externalities occurred when subjects chose public transport or private car, respectively, thereby generating two pure‐strategy equilibria in the mode‐choice game. The experimental results indicated that (i) the transparency of descriptive information facilitated not only the convergence to the efficient equilibrium but also the stabilization of choice behavior, (ii) historical experiences of converging to the inefficient equilibrium could affect subjects' initial choices and even equilibrium selection, and (iii) a “higher” barrier between the two equilibria impeded and prolonged the transformation from the inefficient equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium, and a “deeper” attraction basin of the efficient equilibrium was more attractive in equilibrium selection.

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Section: Behavior Experiments In Transportation Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under some circumstances, mode choices with positive externalities can be interpreted as a social dilemma. See Rapoport et al (2019) for an example.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection

Han

Jia

et al. 2021

Production and Operations Management

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“…Rather than changing the architecture of the network by adding (or deleting) one or more links within a given session, the second stream of experiments on route choice has focused on the social dilemmas in ridesharing [17], the protocol of play (simultaneous vs. sequential choice of routes) [18], the type of uncertainty that the players face [19], and the information structure [19], [20]. A major result of this stream of studies, that complements the results of experiments on the BP, is the robustness of the equilibrium solution as a descriptive model of the aggregate outcomes.…”

Section: A Brief Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning Towards Transportation Network Equilibrium: A Model Comparison Study

Song

Wang

2019

IEEE Access

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As an interdisciplinary topic, human travel-choice behavior has attracted the interests of transportation managers, theoretical computer science researchers and economists. Recent studies on tacit coordination in iterated route choice games (i.e., a large number of subjects could achieve the transportation network equilibrium in limited rounds) have been driven by two questions. (1) Will learning behavior promote tacit coordination in route choice games? (2) Which learning model can best account for these choices/behaviors? To answer the first question, we choose a set of learning models and conduct extensive simulations to determine their success in accounting for major behavioral patterns. To answer the second question, we compare these models to one another by competitively testing their predictions on four different datasets. Although all the selected models account reasonably well for the slow convergence of the mean route choice to equilibrium, they account only moderately well for the mean frequencies of the roundto-round switches from one route to another and fail to appropriately account for substantial individual differences. The implications of these findings for model construction and testing are briefly discussed.INDEX TERMS Route choice game, laboratory experiment, reinforcement learning, tacit coordination, nash equilibrium.

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Persistence or decay of strategic asymmetric dominance in repeated dyadic games?

Colman,

Pulford,

Crombie

2024

Exp Econ

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In a dyadic game, strategic asymmetric dominance occurs when a player’s preference for one strategy A relative to another B is systematically increased by the addition of a third strategy Z, strictly dominated by A but not by B. There are theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that this effect should decline over repetitions, and other grounds for believing, on the contrary, that it should persist. To investigate this question experimentally, 30 participant pairs played 50 rounds of one symmetric and two asymmetric 3 × 3 games each having one strategy strictly dominated by one other, and a control group played 2 × 2 versions of the same games with dominated strategies removed. The strategic asymmetric dominance effect was observed in the repeated-choice data: dominant strategies in the 3 × 3 versions were chosen more frequently than the corresponding strategies in the 2 × 2 versions. Time series analysis revealed a significant decline in the effect over repetitions in the symmetric game only. Supplementary verbal protocol analysis helped to clarify the players’ reasoning and to explain the results.

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When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing

Cited by 7 publications

References 40 publications

Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection

Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection

Learning Towards Transportation Network Equilibrium: A Model Comparison Study

Persistence or decay of strategic asymmetric dominance in repeated dyadic games?

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