“…Let F(x) � 0, F(y) � 0, and F(z) � 0, which can provide eight pure strategy equilibria as well as two mixed strategy equilibria: E(1, 1, 1), E(1, 1, 0), E(1, 0, 1), E(1, 0, 0), E(0, 1, 1), E(0, 1, 0), E(0, 0, 1), E(0, 0, 0), E(0, (Tp + ep + pu3)/(C3 + ep), (C2 − n − fp/ep)), and E(1, (Tp + ep + pu3)/(C3 + ep), (C2 − n − fp/ep)). According to the Lyapunov stability condition, the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable when the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix are less than zero [37]. Calculating the Jacobi matrix's eigenvalues for each equilibrium point separately provides the condition that each equilibrium point is an evolutionary game ESS, as reported in Table 3.…”