What Would it Mean to Call Rorty a Deliberative Democrat?

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to determine whether there exists good reason to apply to Rorty the label “deliberative democrat.” There are elements of Rorty’s work that count both for and against applying this label, which I investigate here. I conclude that, if we can conceive of a deliberative democracy that is not informed by a social epistemology that relies on Reason; if we can conceive of a deliberative democracy that has a wider view of reason and of reasons than is traditionally understood, then we can think of Rorty as a deliberativist; perhaps as a virtue deliberativist with an expansive idea of what counts a reason and what counts as a virtue.

The Promise of Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and Business Ethics

“…Rawls, Habermas), 2 Rorty may be seen as participating in the tradition, or at least the conversation, of deliberative democracy. After all, he held considered views on democratic engagement in society, and a distinctive position on argument, discourse, practices of justification, and the use of persuasion for convincing others about particular beliefs (Dieleman 2017). Nonetheless, there are good reasons to doubt that the label of deliberative democracy should be applied to Rorty's cultural politics, not least because of his emphasis on the role of moral sentiments as opposed to moral reasoning.…”

Richard Rorty and the Demands of Liberalism

“…For Rorty, by contrast, the incuriously cruel are not necessarily bad citizens at all but are at most describable perhaps as bad liberals. Although we can, even within Rorty’s sentimentalist framework, “still speak of things being just or unjust” (Dieleman 2017, 329), his conception of incuriosity seems to stretch beyond the confines of most conventional understandings of injustice. For example, we can conceive the sort of person who acts energetically to identify passive injustices during their daily lives and is a paragon of good citizenship, on Shklar’s account, but who is nevertheless resolutely incurious in terms of their intentionality and interiority, which then defines their outlook on life and attitudes to others.…”

“…For further discussion of Rorty on cruelty, seeBacon and Dianda (2021),Elshtain (2003),Haliburton (1997), andOwen (2001).7 AsBacon (2017, 960) observes, Rorty's understanding denies that we could give any "final" account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of cruelty.8 For a different discussion of Rorty's understanding of democratic deliberation, seeDieleman (2017).…”

The Promise of Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and Business Ethics

“…Given the classic pragmatist tradition that inspired Rorty (e.g., Dewey), and given the political thinkers with whom he engaged (e.g., Rawls, Habermas), 2 Rorty may be seen as participating in the tradition, or at least the conversation, of deliberative democracy. After all, he held considered views on democratic engagement in society and a distinctive position on argument, discourse, practices of justification, and the use of persuasion for convincing others about particular beliefs (Dieleman 2017). Nonetheless, there are good reasons to doubt that the label of deliberative democracy should be applied to Rorty's cultural politics, not least because of his emphasis on the role of moral sentiments as opposed to moral reasoning (Dieleman 2017).…”

“…After all, he held considered views on democratic engagement in society and a distinctive position on argument, discourse, practices of justification, and the use of persuasion for convincing others about particular beliefs (Dieleman 2017). Nonetheless, there are good reasons to doubt that the label of deliberative democracy should be applied to Rorty's cultural politics, not least because of his emphasis on the role of moral sentiments as opposed to moral reasoning (Dieleman 2017). Rorty's use of metaphor and redescription suggests that he is not interested in the exchange of reasoned justifications supported by relevant evidence within democratic arenas.…”