What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism

Abstract

In a context where clientelism is widespread, why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of clientelism: clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives, I posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism. I test this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high. Only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does clientelism decline.

Las señales del compromiso: Movilización política, manifestaciones públicas de apoyo y actos partidarios en la Argentina

“…Desde 1983, el país ha asistido a la consolidación del clientelismo en un proceso democrático competitivo que incluyó la alternancia de partidos en la presidencia de la nación y un grado considerable de rivalidad en el plano subnacional, donde están establecidos los aparatos partidarios. Ciertas investigaciones recientes centradas en el caso argentino han tratado de explicar la persistencia y difusión del clientelismo en las nuevas democracias (Auyero 2000;Calvo y Murillo 2004;Brusco et al 2004;Stokes 2005;Nichter 2008;Szwarcberg 2009;Stokes et al 2013;Weitz-Shapiro 2012).…”

The forensics of patronage: Identifying the linkage between parties and public sector employment in Serbia

“…The roots of political patronage have been found in structural factors such as lower levels of economic development and poverty (Kitschelt, 2000;Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007;Lemarchand, 1972;Scott, 1972;Calvo and Murillo, 2004;Stokes, 2011;Wantchekon, 2003;Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), historical legacies such as the close state-society linkages in post-communist states (Kopecky and Spirova, 2011;Sehring, 2009: 76) and in the timing and nature of political party system development as well as the sequencing of the creation of party systems and professional bureaucracies (O'Dwyer, 2004;Shefter, 1994). While most studies have focused on patronage as being endemic to less developed countries, a growing body of work has examined its continued presence in modern Europe and Asia and its rise and persistence in the former-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Kopecky, Mair and Spirova, 2012;Kopecky and Spirova, 2011;O'Dwyer, 2006).…”

“…More recently, studies of patronage have tried to overcome these weaknesses by moving the analysis to a micro-level with sub-national comparisons (Calvo and Murillo, 2004;Eisenstadt, 2003;Cammett and Issar, 2010;Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), or using other innovative approaches, such as field experiments (Wantchekon, 2003), to study patronage. The strengths of these approaches are twofold.…”

“…However, as previously indicated, one cannot validly test popular sentiments of this type by treating the country in question as a single case. With these points in mind, we join the above-mentioned researchers who use subnational data as a means to both disaggregate the data and increase the number of cases (Calvo and Murillo, 2004;Eisenstadt, 2003;Cammett and Issar, 2010;Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). By focusing on Serbia's 165+ localities, we expand our number of cases sufficiently to employ multivariate regression analyses, shift the level of analysis closer to the individual interactions that are the domain of patronage practices, and control for various historical legacies and cultural factors.…”

Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India

“…The literature identifies several possible determinants of clientelism. These include economic development and public responsiveness to clientelist appeals (Wantchekon 2003;Brusco et al 2004;Weitz-Shapiro 2012), state institutions and politicians' access to public resources (Hicken 2011), and political competition and politicians' incentives to make clientelist appeals (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Other explanations include the role of cultural norms such as reciprocity (Auyero 2000;Putnam 1993), ethnicity (Chandra 2004;Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), and political institutions such as regime type, campaign finance regulations, electoral systems, and ballot design (Golden 2003;van de Walle 2003;Roniger 2004;Lehoucq and Molina 2002;Brusco et al 2004;Hicken 2007).…”