What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Slater, Jérome

doi:10.2307/798058

Cited by 31 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…We note that much has been written about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that many scholars have tried to explain the reasons why it is intractable, and why opportunities to solve it peacefully are repeatedly missed (e.g., Barak, 2005;Bar-Tal, 2007;Golan, 2014;Podeh, 2015;Slater, 2001). Although research in this field has shed light on the intellectual and practical challenges of resolving this conflict, the picture is very complex and needs many perspectives to provide a full explanation for the present stalemate.…”

Section: Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

Young Children in Intractable Conflicts

Nasie

Diamond

Bar‐Tal

2016

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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The article examines the political socialization of young Jewish-Israeli children who live under the Israeli-Palestinian intractable conflict. It proposes arguments and presents empirical evidence to suggest that the way in which political socialization of young children happens in this context contributes to the development of conflict-supporting narratives of ethos of conflict and collective memory by the youngest generation. As a result, the conflict solidifies adherence to these narratives in adulthood, thereby serving as a major obstacle to the processes of peace-making and peace-building. Specifically, as evidence for showing how the political socialization works in Israel, a series of studies conducted in Israeli kindergartens and elementary schools are presented. These studies recount the contents acquired by young children, as well as contents delivered by teachers, related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This indicates the serious consequences of acquiring conflict-supporting narratives at an early age in societies involved in intractable conflict.

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Section: Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

Young Children in Intractable Conflicts

Nasie

Diamond

Bar‐Tal

2016

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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“…One of the major causes of U.S. political problems in the Muslim world is American support for Israel, a policy that enjoys strong, bipartisan domestic support that Israel works hard to cultivate. 76 Intelligence agencies therefore have major, domestic, politically generated disincentives for warning against the consequences of U.S. ties to Israel, which provide al Qaeda with recruiting incentives, a large reservoir of supporters, and sanctuaries in which al Qaeda and similarly minded groups can plan strikes against U.S. interests. 77 By diminishing U.S. credibility and access in the Muslim world, such policies also hamper U.S. intelligence collection and hence analytic efforts, not to mention military operations, increasing the chances of more warning failures.…”

Section: Enemy (And Friendly) Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intelligence Failure Retrained

Gentry

2008

Political Science Quarterly

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“…In the years following the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993, the second Intifada, and the subsequent breakdown of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, much has been written about “what went wrong” and how meaningful peace between Israelis and Palestinians can be reestablished (see e.g., Hanieh 2001; Pundak 2001; Slater 2001). Much of this analysis has focused on weaknesses within the official peace‐making process, which is indeed where the main responsibility for failure rests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Çuhadar

Dayton

2012

Negotiation Journal

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Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.

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What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Young Children in Intractable Conflicts

Young Children in Intractable Conflicts

Intelligence Failure Retrained

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

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