What use was the election to us? Clientelism and political trust amongst ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Abstract

This paper posits that a great deal of cross-national variation in clientelistic investment strategies can be explained through an examination of the different forms of risk faced by the political elite of different types of regimes. It also maintains that demand from clients/potential clients is, by itself, insufficient to explain the level or scope of clientelistic investments. The argument is advanced through an examination of the linkages (and non-linkages) between patrons/potential patrons and clients/potential clients amongst the ethnic Uzbek populations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, a semi-authoritarian state, electoral risk predominates; however, the character of electoral risk in Kyrgyzstan provides Uzbek members of the political elite with an incentive to diversify their clientelistic investments. Consequently, many engage in direct exchanges with their constituents while simultaneously investing in private, cultural organizations that serve party-like functions. Alternatively, in contemporary Tajikistan, best described as an authoritarian state, electoral risk has been replaced with the risk of expulsion from the presidential clientelistic network. As a result, members of the Tajikistani political elite have a disincentive to publicly invest in constituent clients as this investment may increase the risk of expulsion.

Authoritarianism, Ethnic Management and Non-Securitisation: The Kyrgyz Minority in Uzbekistan

“…In contrast to the extensive work on Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan (Fumagalli, 2007, Hierman, 2010, Liu, 2012, and some detailed research about Kyrgyz communities in China (Baitur, 1992, Asankanov, 2010, there has been relatively little research on the Kyrgyz of Uzbekistan. There have been comparative studies of Uzbek and Kyrgyz legends (Ishniyozova, 1996) and proverbs (Temirova, 2018).…”

From mice-eaten passports to fingerprint scanning: fluctuating state presence and ‘entangled documents’ along the Kyrgyz–Uzbek border

“…This further marginalized Uzbeks within Kyrgyz society as their networks of support within the political, economic and the bureaucratic realm of the state were shattered and their opportunities in life were directly determined and limited by their ethnicity (Hierman 2015). Uzbek interactions with the Kyrgyz state became increasingly defined through the power relations between these two ethnic groups (Hierman 2010(Hierman , 2015. As many Uzbeks living in rural areas lacked the required knowledge and connections, their meetings with the bureaucracy took place on unfavourable termsterms they sought to overcome through other means.…”

Whose land is it? Land reform, minorities, and the titular “nation” in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan

“…11 As in the previously discussed cases, however, official nationalizing discourse asserting the rights and privileges of the titular ethnic group has not always translated into exclusionary practices on the ground. Despite the racist language surrounding the Aryan "myth," for instance, Uzbek-Tajik differences have not become politically salient (Hierman 2010). The disjuncture between nationalizing discourse and practice is especially notable in the realm of land reform.…”