What Types of Values Enter Simulation Validation and What Are Their Roles?

Hadorn, Gertrude Hirsch; Baumberger, Christoph

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70766-2_40

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…32 Some authors use "epistemic values" for what I call "scientific values" (for instance, (McMullin, 1983), p. 6 and also (Reiss, 2017), p. 135), also the term "cognitive values" is in use (see, e.g., (Douglas, 2013)). (McMullin, 1983), p. 18 calls values that I call instrumental scientific values "pragmatic" values.-For discussion of different subgroups of scientific values and their various functions see (Douglas, 2013), (Hirsch Hadorn, 2018), and(Hirsch Hadorn &Baumberger, 2019). 33 For references acknowledging the first route, see (Carrier, 2022), p. 8, for the second route see ibid., p. 7.…”

Section: The Ideal Of a Value-free Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk

Hoyningen‐Huene

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.

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