What to Lock?

Yasin, Muhammad; Sengupta, Aditi; Schäfer, Benjamin Carrión; Makris, Yiorgos; Sinanoglu, Ozgur; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan

doi:10.1145/3060403.3060492

Cited by 80 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Random LL [111] XOR-based key insertion at random locations Yes SARlock [205] Flipping circuits to corrupt input pattern Yes Anti-SAT [206] Additional anti-SAT combinational blocks Yes TT-Lock [207] Wrong key enabling by flipping output patterns Yes NML [117] Nonvolatility of magnetic logic No Memristive array-based [116] Ta/HfO 2 memristive array with a key destruction scheme No BP-based FET [118] Tunable polarity and reconfigurability of device No MoS 2 -based FET [26] Electrical programming of individual device No and reliability of electronics systems deployed in critical applications such as electronic warfare and military aircraft. [138] While several different types of counterfeits such as cloned, recycled, overproduced, remarked, etc., exist, reports indicate that recycled ICs constitute the majority (≈80%) of all counterfeit ICs.…”

Section: Table 5 Comparison Of Different Ll Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware and Information Security Primitives Based on 2D Materials and Devices

Wali

Das

2023

Advanced Materials

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Hardware security is a major concern for the entire semiconductor ecosystem that accounts for billions of dollars in annual losses. Similarly, information security is a critical need for the rapidly proliferating edge devices that continuously collect and communicate a massive volume of data. While silicon‐based complementary metal‐oxide‐semiconductor technology offers security solutions, these are largely inadequate, inefficient, and often inconclusive, as well as resource intensive in time, energy, and cost, leading to tremendous room for innovation in this field. Furthermore, silicon‐based security primitives have shown vulnerability to machine learning (ML) attacks. In recent years, 2D materials such as graphene and transition metal dichalcogenides have been intensely explored to mitigate these security challenges. In this review, 2D‐materials‐based hardware security solutions such as camouflaging, true random number generation, watermarking, anticounterfeiting, physically unclonable functions, and logic locking of integrated circuits (ICs) are summarized with accompanying discussion on their reliability and resilience to ML attacks. In addition, the role of native defects in 2D materials in developing high entropy hardware security primitives is also examined. Finally, the existing challenges for 2D materials, which must be overcome for large‐scale deployment of 2D ICs to meet the security needs of the semiconductor industry, are discussed.

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Section: Table 5 Comparison Of Different Ll Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware and Information Security Primitives Based on 2D Materials and Devices

Wali

Das

2023

Advanced Materials

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“…Tenacious and traceless logic locking (TTL) [13] inverts the output of a logic cone for one protected input pattern by modifying the cone via logic gate insertions or replacements. Modified logic cones now have inverted outputs only for the protected input pattern.…”

Section: Principles Of Tenacious and Traceless Logic Lockingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, those two algorithms both have low corruptibility and are broken by removal attacks [11,12]. Tenacious and traceless logic locking (TTL) [13] and its enhancement, stripped functionality logic locking-Hamming distance (SFLL-HD) [14], are resilient to both SAT and removal attacks and SFLL-HD provides a solid level of corruptibility. Along with these algorithms, which lock a design on a gate-level, some algorithms lock a design on the RTL level such as SFLL-HLS [15] and ASSURE [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lockit: A Logic Locking Automation Software

2021

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The significant rise in the cost of manufacturing nanoscale integrated circuits (ICs) has led the majority of IC design companies to outsource the fabrication of their products to other companies, often located in different countries. The multinational nature of the hardware supply chain has led to a host of security threats, including IP piracy, IC overproduction, and Trojan insertion. To combat these, researchers have proposed logic locking techniques to protect the intellectual properties of the design and increase the difficulty of malicious modification of its functionality. However, the adoption of logic locking approaches has been rather slow due to the lack of integration with the IC production process and the lack of efficacy of existing algorithms. This work automates the logic locking process by developing software using Python that performs the locking on a gate-level netlist, which can be integrated with the existing digital synthesis tools. Analysis of the latest logic locking algorithms has demonstrated that the SFLL-HD algorithm is one of the most secure and versatile when trading-off levels of protection against different types of attacks and was thus selected for implementation. The presented tool can also be expanded to incorporate the latest locking mechanisms to keep up with the fast-paced development in this field. The paper also presents a case study to demonstrate the functionality of the tool and how it could be used to explore the design space and compare different locking solutions.

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“…These resistant locking techniques generally fall into two categories based on how they resist the miter-based SAT attack. The first group [24,25,28,29] focuses on reducing the number of keys ruled out per attack iteration, significantly increasing the expected number of iterations. In practice however, these techniques are susceptible to removal attacks since the circuitry is typically traceable through properties such as signal probability or Boolean sensitivity [22,26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%