What the metasemantics of know is not

Elswyk, Peter van

doi:10.1007/s10988-019-09263-w

Linguist and Philos

2019

DOI: 10.1007/s10988-019-09263-w

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What the metasemantics of know is not

Peter van Elswyk

Abstract: Penultimate draft ⋅ Forthcoming in Linguistics & PhilosophyEpistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject's evidence in a context.

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References 41 publications

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“…88For recent discussions of contrastivism, see, e.g., DeRose (2011), Pritchard (2008), Neta (2008), Kvanvig (2007), Schaffer and Knobe (2012), and van Elswyk (forthcoming).…”

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Perception, discrimination, and knowledge

Callahan

2020

Philosophical Issues

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In perception, perceivers discriminate. They distinguish or single out the objects and property instances that they see. One might hope this discriminatory nature of perception could help explain how perceptual evidence can be sufficient for knowledge, even granting some form of a relevant alternatives condition on knowledge. Indeed, there are examples of such thinking in recent epistemology literature. But I argue that discriminating actual percepts from actual surrounds is importantly different than discriminating actual states of affairs from merely possible states of affairs. A tension remains between optimism about immediate perceptual knowledge and plausible relevant alternatives or safety conditions on knowledge in general.

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“…88For recent discussions of contrastivism, see, e.g., DeRose (2011), Pritchard (2008), Neta (2008), Kvanvig (2007), Schaffer and Knobe (2012), and van Elswyk (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%

Perception, discrimination, and knowledge

Callahan

2020

Philosophical Issues

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Ways to Knowledge-First Believe

Wimmer

2021

Erkenn

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A defense of QUD reasons contextualism

Weaver

Scharp

2023

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What the metasemantics of know is not

Abstract: Penultimate draft ⋅ Forthcoming in Linguistics & PhilosophyEpistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject's evidence in a context.

Cited by 4 publications

References 41 publications

Perception, discrimination, and knowledge

Perception, discrimination, and knowledge

Ways to Knowledge-First Believe

A defense of QUD reasons contextualism

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