What’s wrong with everyday lookism?

Abstract

Everyday lookism, by which I mean the widespread practice of commenting upon and judging the appearance of others, is often regarded as morally troubling. But when, and why, is it morally problematic? I argue that in many cases everyday lookism is wrongful because it involves morally objectionable appearance discrimination. I consider various respects in which everyday lookism can be morally objectionable in virtue of the acts of wrongful discrimination it involves. I argue that these acts are wrongful when they are demeaning, or when they have unjust consequences whether singly or cumulatively. There are a number of ways in which they may have unjust consequences. First, the appearance norms in which these acts are rooted may be biased in such a way that the acts contribute to creating an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. Second, these acts may combine to make everyday lookism oppressive in virtue of impairing the personal autonomy of its victims or contributing to doing so. Third, these acts may be unjustly harmful in terms of their effects.

Feasibility and social rights

“…In this case, it seems natural to think that we might have a collective duty to correct this pattern by taking steps to change socio-sexual norms. The same logic also applies to norms surrounding the perceived disvalue of disabled bodies, individuals of certain castes, and the conventionally unattractive (Mason, 2021). To be pithy: if we did not live in a world where individuals were so picky about who they fell in love with, wanted to be friends with, or raise children with, more individuals would have their claims to (even spontaneous) affective social labour fulfilled.…”

LGBT‐Inclusive Education in Liberal Pluralist Societies

“…In his discussion of appearance norms, Andrew Mason has argued that even when a person rejects … a social norm … but she nevertheless experiences feelings of shame and guilt when she doesn't comply with it, and she cannot get rid of these feelings or can do so only with great difficulty, then these costs should count in determining whether her autonomy is impaired. 41 We might say the same in relation to beliefs. We can exercise our autonomy by standing back and critically evaluating a belief, ultimately rejecting it.…”

Personal Beauty and Personal Agency

“…Lookism may impair agency by harming autonomy. Andrew Mason takes a broad view of lookism, arguing that “the widespread practice of commenting upon and judging the appearances of others” may be “demeaning” even when no one involved takes the practice to be so (2021, pp. 315–317).…”

“…315–317). On Mason's view, lookism impairs autonomy because it undermines our reflective capacities, or the pursuit of the good life, or forces us to adopt a version of the good life we do not endorse (2021, p. 326). By impairing epistemic abilities, lookism impairs moral agency.…”