What Ought I to Do?

Chalier, Catherine; Todd, Jane Marie

doi:10.7591/9781501722530

Cited by 30 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Similarly, Charlier speaks of the “tyranny of the impersonal” (Charlier, 2002, p. 74), arguing that rationality “does not suffice to abolish tyranny” because “it knows nothing of people's faces” (p. 74). This critique is in line with the core arguments of Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) who speak about the “identifying reason,” which is when we homogenize and subject everything to given categories, the personal (real and concrete) gets subjected to the universal (abstract).…”

Section: In Defense Of (A Bounded) Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-Truth as an Epistemic Crisis: The Need for Rationality, Autonomy, and Pluralism

Hoggan-Kloubert

Hoggan

2022

Adult Education Quarterly

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Contemporary society is experiencing an epistemic crisis, evidenced by such “post-truth” phenomena as “alternative facts.” Traditional notions related to knowledge and Truth have been under continual, partly justifiable, attack under the eclectic banner of postmodernism, and alternative epistemic foundations (essential for democracy to function) have not been provided. Drawing on the European and North American literature of political theory, philosophy, and adult education, this article offers an update and defense of three core epistemic concepts: rationality, autonomy, and pluralism. To address the epistemic crisis, adult education needs to develop epistemically responsible learners, promote diverse public learning spaces (agoras), and teach learners how to engage in meaningful dialogue outside of their own echo chambers.

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Section: In Defense Of (A Bounded) Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-Truth as an Epistemic Crisis: The Need for Rationality, Autonomy, and Pluralism

Hoggan-Kloubert

Hoggan

2022

Adult Education Quarterly

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“…And that in this one regard -that is, in assessing the relation between the primordiality of ethics and the contingency of prescription -the texts need to be read for their assessment of jurisprudential normativity rather than for their illumination of religious doctrine. 5 As opposed to Catherine Chalier (2002) in What ought I to Do?, I take Levinas to be simply unwilling or incapable of providing anything like an action guiding principle and al claims of Levinas commitment to some putative duty of responsibility, respect for alterity of the other, et al are profound misunderstandings of the metaphysical nature of Levinas' use of the term ethics. Levinas' metaphysics is merely concerned with the manner in which heteronomous principles of action happen to operate.…”

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confidence: 93%

A Sketch for a Levinasian Theory of Action

Gak

2012

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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“…The other's suffering becomes my own suffering: a suffering for the other's suffering" (Cohen 2016, p. 54). Catherine Chalier compares Kantian ethics and Levinasian ethics around the question of the relationship between virtue and happiness (Chalier 2002). However, a systematic study of the relationship between pleasure and the Good in Levinas's philosophy is necessary.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Levinas on the Relationship between Pleasure and the Good

Wang

Jiang

2022

Religions

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The article discusses the relationship between pleasure and the Good in Levinas’s ethics. Firstly, the paper points out that, for Levinas, pleasure and the Good are both essentially related to sensibility, except that pleasure is concerned with the self-affection of sensibility, and the Good is concerned with the hetero-affection of sensibility. The self-affection of pleasure and enjoyment enables the subject to locate and contract itself, and thus to establish an inner and separated self. Meanwhile, the Good is originated from the hetero-affection of the call of the transcendent Other, and is embodied in an involuntary suffering for the other’s suffering, weakness, and needs. Secondly, the paper argues that the relationship between pleasure and the Good is highly tensional. On the one hand, the Good does interrupt the egoism of life and its pleasure. On the other hand, pleasure actually constitutes a necessary condition for the Good, rather than something that must be rejected. The intersection of pleasure and the Good constitutes an insurmountable and irreducible tension within subjectivity. Finally, the paper places Levinas’s ethics in a dialogue with hedonism, virtue ethics, asceticism, and deontology, and regards Levinas’s ethics as a new paradigm for understanding the relationship between pleasure and the Good in the history of Western ethics.

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What Ought I to Do?

Cited by 30 publications

References 0 publications

Post-Truth as an Epistemic Crisis: The Need for Rationality, Autonomy, and Pluralism

Post-Truth as an Epistemic Crisis: The Need for Rationality, Autonomy, and Pluralism

A Sketch for a Levinasian Theory of Action

Levinas on the Relationship between Pleasure and the Good

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