What Morality is

Abstract

I shall in this paper defend a universalizability thesis against certain objections. It will shortly be clear that the thesis defended is not the universalizability thesis as generally understood but something which differs crucially from it in that it claims no role whatsoever in ‘the definition of morality’. My title may therefore be misleading in this respect.

A Critique of MacIntyrean Morality From a Kantian Perspective

“…In addition, “It is possible that a man, who is not guilty of any weakness of will, may have two sets of principles—one to guide his own conduct and the other to appraise (better to say guide) other’s actions” (MacIntyre, 1957, p. 332). MacIntyre’s above argument has already been well challenged by Anne MacLean (MacLean, 1984). MacLean argues that since MacIntyre drops the notion of duty from his concept of my duty , he can say nothing about the way that other people act.…”

“…MacLean argues that since MacIntyre drops the notion of duty from his concept of my duty , he can say nothing about the way that other people act. She further argues that MacIntyre cannot morally approve or disapprove the actions of others since from his my duty concept, he “must regard all such actions as morally indifferent” (MacLean, 1984, pp. 23-24).…”

Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts

“…While Kovesi's MN received some initially positive assessment (but for dissent see Thomas 1968) and while his work has remained influential among a heterogeneous group of thinkers, his work has still not received the attention that it deserves (though he has hardly been ignored: see Bambrough 1979;Brennan 1977;Clark 1980;Connolly 1972;Doughney 2005Doughney , 2006Elshtain 2004;Ewin 2002;French 1977;Graham 1975;Harrison 1983Harrison , 1984Jotterand 2004;Kim 1990;Kleinig 1996;Maclean 1984;Midgley 1980;Milbank 1999;Porter 1990;Shiner and Bickenbach 1976). We will not examine why Kovesi's work has not enjoyed as central a position on the philosophical stage as it might have.…”