2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.06.005
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What makes people go to war? Defensive intentions motivate retaliatory and preemptive intergroup aggression

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Cited by 95 publications
(79 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
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“…All group members participated so no subset incurred most of the costs, and chances for any sort of in-kind repayment are clearly limited. However, it is worth noting that their behavior is consistent with recent experimental work in humans indicating that perceived threat to the in-group causes not only retaliatory, but also preemptive aggression54.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 85%
“…All group members participated so no subset incurred most of the costs, and chances for any sort of in-kind repayment are clearly limited. However, it is worth noting that their behavior is consistent with recent experimental work in humans indicating that perceived threat to the in-group causes not only retaliatory, but also preemptive aggression54.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 85%
“…Weak parochial cooperation is intertwined either with universal cooperation or with strong parochial cooperation in the IPD-MD and the NSD, respectively. 7 Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate the relevance of universal, weak parochial, and strong parochial cooperation as well as egoism and suggest how these preferences can potentially determine the course of between-group relations: from competition (strong parochial cooperation; Böhm et al, 2016) to coalition (universal cooperation; Buchan et al, 2009). Experiment 3 shows that these different preferences may follow from interindividual differences: A preference for hierarchies can fuel hostilities between groups by instigating strong parochial cooperation, while EC limits cooperation to the ingroup.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because, assuming this alternative explanation is right, one would expect that beliefs about the expressed out-party hostility of the out-party members would, to some extent at least, also affect subjects' own choice to express out-party hostility. For example, it is reasonable to expect that they would be positively correlated-reflecting a desire for "pre-emptive strike" (Böhm et al, 2016;Simunovic et al, 2013); in other words, if I think the out-party will aggress against me, I am more inclined to aggress against them. That we did not observe such an association provides some evidence that subjects were not tailoring their own out-party hostility behaviour to what they believed the other players in the IPD-MD would do.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%