What Makes Logical Truths True?

Abstract

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry.KEYWORDS: empirical interpretation of logical truths, ontological interpretation of logical truths, semantic interpretation of logical truths, the nature of logical truths 1 Ernest Nagel, "Logic without Ontology," in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant H.

Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths

“…The elimination rules are not reduced to the introduction ones in the common sense of reduction, i.e., that of being formally derived, but rather by showing how Bthey can be justified in some semantic way^[(Prawitz 2006):510].29 A detailed description and analysis of these philosophical accounts of FOLTs are found in(Brîncuș 2016). For a more comprehensive historical survey of the main philosophical approaches to logic, in analogy with those from the philosophy of mathematics, see(Maddy 2012).…”