What Makes an Agency Independent?

Abstract

The responsiveness of government agencies to elected officials is a central question in democratic governance. A key source of variation in responsiveness is agency structure. Yet scholars often view agencies as falling into broad structural categories (e.g., cabinet departments or independent commissions) or fixate on some features of design (e.g., "for cause" protections). I develop new estimates of structural independence based on new data on 50 different structural features of 321 federal agencies in the federal executive establishment. Using a Bayesian latent variable model, I estimate independence on two dimensions: limits on the appointment of key agency decision makers and limits on political review of agency policy. I illustrate the value of this new measure by using it to examine how structure affects political influence and how agency independence can vary over time.

Adjudicating Executive Privilege: Federal Administrative Agencies and Deliberative Process Privilege Claims in U.S. District Courts

“…Generally, the president has greater control over policy, hiring and firing, budgets, rulemaking, and reorganization in executive branch agencies (Lewis 2008;Moe 1982;Sheehan 1992;Wood and Waterman 1991). Independence, as it relates to federal agencies, can refer to independence of agency leadership and/or an independence of policy decisions (Selin 2015). Independent agencies are associated with party-balancing requirements, term limits, and other features that limit the president's ability to appoint and remove agency leadership (Aberbach and Rockman 2009;Lewis 2003).…”

Retracted: Setting the Regulatory Agenda: Statutory Deadlines and the Conditions for Compliance

“…Structural features that insulate an agency purposefully decrease that agency's incentive to be responsive to elected officials (Hammond 1986;Hammond and Knott 1996;Lewis 2003;Moe 1989). While much of the work on insulation focuses on independent commissions, the precise structural mechanisms of insulation are varied (Selin 2015). Structural insulation can derive from many features that limit either the appointment of agency decision makers or the political review of agency decisions (Selin 2015).…”

“…While much of the work on insulation focuses on independent commissions, the precise structural mechanisms of insulation are varied (Selin 2015). Structural insulation can derive from many features that limit either the appointment of agency decision makers or the political review of agency decisions (Selin 2015).…”

“…To capture agency insulation, we use Selin's (2015) measure of the statutory limitations placed on those in key leadership positions in an agency. 12 The average insulation score in our data is -0.32 (SD = 0.79).…”

Unpacking the Effects of Competing Mandates on Agency Performance

“…In this data set, the U.S. Navy is the most conservative agency, with a score of 2.4, and the Commission on Civil Rights is the most liberal, scoring –2.01. Agency positioning relative to political overseers is measured through both a dummy variable, statutory independence, where 1 signifies that the agency resides outside of an executive department, and Jennifer Selin's () measure of effective independence, where more positive values mean greater independence. Because Selin assesses the independence of decision makers and policy decisions separately, the two were averaged to form the variable used.…”