What Kind of Normativity is the Normativity of Grammar?

Abstract

The overall goal of this article is to show that aesthetics plays a major role in a debate at the very center of philosophy. Drawing on the work of David Bell, the article spells out how Kant and Wittgenstein use reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as a key in their respective solutions to the rule‐following problem they share. The more specific goal is to offer a Kantian account of semantic normativity as understood by Wittgenstein. The article argues that Wittgenstein's reason for describing language as a collection of language games is to allow for a perspective that shows those games as internally purposive without any extralinguistic purpose. This perspective also allows for that union of the general rule and its particular application in practice that the original paradox of rule‐following is wanting.

Wittgenstein on the grounds of religious faith: A Kantian proposal

“…This is the very assumption that is called into question by Kant's Third critique . Moreover, as argued here, Wittgenstein follows Kant in this respect (see Appelqvist, ).…”

“…Although it may seem strange to talk about satisfaction in the case of the grammatical rules of language, Wittgenstein himself illustrates the understanding of a sentence by comparing it with the understanding of a musical tune. The point is that in both cases, my understanding may take the form, not of an ability to discursively explain the content of the sentence or the tune, but of an experience of the sentence or tune saying something that cannot be expressed by providing a paraphrase but only by further descriptions and comparisons (PI §§ 527, 531; see Bell, , and Appelqvist, ).…”